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List of Acronyms Used 
CA – Constitutional Assembly 
CAP – Conflict-Affected Peoples 
CDO – Chief District Officer 
CLPC – Community Level Peace Committee  
CPA – Comprehensive Peace Accord 
CPRP – Center for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program 
CT – Conflict Transformation 
DAO – District Administration Office 
IDP – Internally Displaced Peoples  
LPC – Local Peace Committee 
LPF – Local Peace-building Forums   
MOPR – Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 
NCP – Nepali Congress Party 
NMCC – National Monitoring Committee on the Code of Conduct for the Ceasefire 
NPTF – Nepal Peace Trust Fund 
PB – Peacebuilding 
PLA – People’s Liberation Army  
SPA – Seven Party Alliance 
TOR – Terms of Reference 
TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
VDC – Village Development Committee 
VLPC – Village Level Peace Committee (sometimes interchangeable with CLPC)  
UCPN-M – United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist 
UNMIN – United Nations Mission in Nepal 
List of Nepali/Sanskrit Terms 
Bandhs – political demonstrations or strike often involving transportation which causes road and 
business closures, sometimes enforced by barricades, due to the threat of violence. A tactic often 
used by the Maoists frequently. 
Dalits- still considered untouchables and face huge social discrimination within the country. To 
mitigate this they demand proportional representation within all bodies of the state.  
Janajatis – Indigenious peoples of Nepal  
Jana Andolan I, II – People’s Movement in 1990 (establishing a constitutional 
monarchy/parliamentary democracy) and in 2006 (establishing the renunciation of King 
Gyanendra and the starting a new constitutional process towards a federal republic). 
Kamaiya – system of bonded labor found in the western regions in Nepal, often using children as 
slave laborers to pay off the debt of their parents.  
Palali – a term used to describe the hill people of Nepal.  
Terai – Nepal’s lowlands located on the Gangetic Plains bordering India. 
Samar Basi – literally translating to ‘we go together’ it has been used to describe inclusivity in 




“We have ears but no hearing. We have eyes but no sight. But I hope our children do not have to 
go through a similar fate of ignorance.” – Kattike Nepali (Jumla) 
 
From 1996 to 2006 Nepal experienced a horrible, civil conflict taking over 13,000 of its 
citizens, displaced another 25,000 with many more unaccounted for. With the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006, between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists 
insurgents, the violence ceased but the long road to recovery and peace began. Nepal is currently 
transitioning towards a democratic government. The establishment of a Constitutional Assembly 
(CA) in 2008 allowed many marginalized voices to be heard and began the process of creating a 
near complete product of what could have become the new constitution for the country. 
Unfortunately, the CA was dissolved in May 2011 before the constitution was drafted due to lack 
of political consensus on the issue of federalism. Bandhs (political demonstrations), poverty, 
ethnic discrimination, lack of access to resources, and oppression of marginalized groups are 
some of the challenges Nepalis are still working to transform and heal their country after the 
conflict.  
One mechanism aiding the peace process is the creation of the Local Peace Committees 
(LPC) that seek to promote inclusivity, peace, and restoration of the country through grassroots 
leadership, dialogical processes and the mediation of local conflicts. Nepal is in a state of 
political transition as they continue to create a constitution representative of its diverse peoples. 
The following paper is a case study of the LPCs in one district, noting the challenges and 
effectiveness of the LPCs pertaining to the wider peace process in Nepal. While the LPCs have 
experienced several challenges due to political instability, they have been able to create a 
structure by which to use conflict resolution processes and other strategies to works toward 




From 1996 to 2006, Nepal experienced civil conflict that claimed the lives of more than 
13,000 of its people. Even during the destruction and bloodshed there was hope that peace will 
be restored to the country. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006 
between the Nepali government and the Maoists insurgents, the violence ceased. While peace is 
a process that takes decades to be fully realized, it is important to have hope. This paper is about 
hope for Nepalis to come together and transform their country after extreme armed-conflict into 
a republic representative of its diverse population. It is about inclusion and Samar Basi – going 
there together, going towards peace together.  The establishment of a Constitutional Assembly 
(CA) in 2008 allowed many marginalized voices to be heard.  Unfortunately, due to a lack of 
political consensus on the issues of federalism, the CA was dissolved in May 2011 before a 
constitution could be drafted.  Today, Nepalis are still working to transform and heal their 
country after the conflict.  One such mechanism that has aided the peace process is the creation 
of the Local Peace Committees (LPC) seeking to promote inclusivity of all groups through 
grassroots leadership, dialogical processes and mediation of local conflicts.   
Contextual Information  
This paper is structured in a Course Linked Capstone (CLC) format bridging the theories 
of coursework in Initiatives in Peacebuilding to experiences and research conducted in Nepal. 
The focus is on the Local Peace Committees as one mechanism to build peace. The Local Peace 
Committees were created as part of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA): 
To create an environment conducive for a just system in a transitional period through restoration 
of sustainable peace by resolving the remnants of conflict at the local level and systematically 
promoting the processes of peace and reconstruction through mutual goodwill and unity; To 
address the concerns and complaints of local stakeholders for democratic values and beliefs and a 




The Center for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program (CPRP)
1
 in Nepal works in 
collaboration with international organizations to provide trainings in mediation and dialogue 
processes for peace committee members. CPRP allowed me to work directly in the field of 
Peacebuilding (PB) and Conflict Transformation (CT)
2
 assisting with trainings of the LPCs and 
village level committees.  During these trainings, I facilitated activities and put theoretical 
knowledge of CT and PB into practice.  I also evaluated the effectiveness of the trainings on 
increasing capacities of the LPCs. From my experiences at CPRP, I examined the role of the 
LPCs in building peace at the local level and pertaining to the wider peace process in Nepal.  
Background of Conflict 
The people of Nepal are currently fighting for political representation and democracy.  
Two historical events have led to change in Nepal. The first was India gaining its independence 
in 1947 allowing Nepal to open its borders to the outside world in 1950. The second event was 
when the people revolted against the Rana Dynasty giving way to democracy in 1951.  The 
general elections held in 1959 established a democratically-elected government.  However, 
within two years the monarchy dissolved parliament and abolished all political parties.  In 1980, 
there was a referendum that weakened the no-party system, but didn’t eradicate it completely. It 
wasn’t until Jana Andolan (I), the first people's movement, in 1990, that the no-party system was 
abolished and a multi-party constitution was restored. Within a year, the democratic constitution 
gave the Nepalese people sovereignty for the first time. Even after this restoration, the next six 
                                                   
1
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SODARC) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization registered under the Associations Registration 
Act, 1977. It was registered with the District Administration Office, Kathmandu in February 1996 (Regd 
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years would be marked by political instability in the new parliament. In 1996 the “People’s War” 
started with the armed-insurgency of the Maoist Communist Party burning a physical copy of the 
1990 Constitution.  
Because of these upheavals the people lost momentum from the first people’s movement 
and had to deal with the violent struggle from the Maoists that were taking thousands of lives 
and displacing thousands more. In February 2005, the country was pushed into further turmoil by 
King Gyanendra who imposed martial law and reinstated absolute monarchy. The people were 
not happy and resisted publically.  In November 2005, a 12-point agreement was signed by the 
Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists.
3
 This halted the armed movement and allowed for 
everyone to participate in Jana Andolan II, the second people’s movement in April 2006. 
Thousands of Nepalese protested the monarchy in the streets and ultimately forced the abdication 
of the king and reinstatement of parliament.  The Maoists joined the government and signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on November 21
st
, 2006.  The CPA ensures the end of 
violence with the promise of social, economic, and political transformation by adhering to 
humanitarian law and peaceful settlement of disputes. Subsequently, there have been six 
commissions established to implement and monitor these promises: Disappeared Persons, Truth 
and Reconciliation, State Restructuring, Scientific Land Reform, Monitoring Committee for the 
Effective Implementation of the CPA and other Agreements, and the High-Level Peace 
Commission (Bhatta, 2012). The Peace Secretariat and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 
with the Nepal Peace Trust Fund work to institutionalize the peace process with the national 
government in the hopes that peace will be more sustainable.  
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In 2008, the people elected their assembly to establish a new constitution for a Federal 
Republic.  The Constitutional Assembly (CA) allowed these groups to have their voices heard, as 
it was the first body of its kind to have all the ethnic and religious groups represented. There was 
an overwhelming desire to break from the centralized government in Kathmandu and to have 
autonomous regions within the rest of the country. “State restructuring, autonomy, the right to 
self-determination, and federalism” were the terms given to define the demands by the people 
(Pathak, 2007). Unfortunately, defining federalism manifested itself in two dominant ways. The 
first revolved around finding definitions acceptable to all groups. The second was how to divide 
these ethnic groups into various autonomous regions based on their geographic vastness.  
The Maoists have 32% of seats and must assent to any significant decisions within the 
CA, a factor greatly contributing to the difficulties of establishing consensus within the various 
parties. However, all political parties have splintered and increased their numbers in the CA, but 
“the lines of difference are not over ideologies but over individual personality which 
subsequently works as a catalyst to form intra-party wings representing opposite approaches to 
political issues” (Bhatta, 2012, p. 2).  It has been said that “the biggest problem lies with the fact 
that Nepalese leaders come up with various agreements and programmes but they only remain on 
the paper and never implemented in the real sense” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 28). This is 
evident by the nearly 50 agreements that have been written between political parties, government 
officials and ministries since the end of the conflict in 2006. This is also similar to what is 
currently hindering the LPCs.  
The CA was initially given two years to write the new constitution. Yet, after a two-year 
extension, they were still unable to reach consensus on the language of the new constitution. The 
2011 deadline came and went. The CA was effectively dissolved on May 28
th
, 2011.  An election 
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date was set for November 22
nd 
2012 to elect a new CA, but this date came and went as well. The 
election was set for June 21
st
, 2013 but have once again been postponed until November 2013.  
However, people are skeptical that an election will take place. “The domination of discourse by 
power politics has made both peace-building and the constitution-drafting process an uphill task, 
widened the trust gap, and reinforced the political culture of negation across the political 
spectrum” (Bhatta, 2012, p. 2). This tension between political parties over power-sharing and the 
language of the constitution, whether democratic, People’s Republic or ethnic-federalism, is 
hindering the peace process and no one knows for how long.  
Purpose of Research 
Nepal is in a state of political transition as they continue to create a constitution 
representative of its diverse peoples.  While the LPCs have experienced several challenges due to 
the political instability, they have been able to create a structure by which to use conflict 
resolution processes in an attempt to sustain peace.  Whether the conflicts are being resolved or 
mitigated at the local level by committee members is yet to be determined. Since LPCs formed in 
2007, only a handful of districts had working committees. By 2009, there were 55 districts that 
had established peace committees but this was still short of the 75 total districts, and thus 75 
desired peace committees, in Nepal. There has been little research done as to the effectiveness of 
the committees in bringing about peace and reconstruction in the country. The LPCs are 
experiencing several challenges, both internal and external, making it difficult to function and 
work with other institutions striving for peace and justice within the country.  
One such institution the LPCs need to cooperate with is the Chief District Office (CDO). 
Previously, local disputes would be sent to the CDO, representing the structure and source of the 
local government. Because the disputes are too numerous to handle the peace committees have 
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supplemented the efforts to resolve these conflicts. However, with corruption affecting many 
areas, especially among the police and sometimes even within the LPCs, this gridlock is creating 
serious barriers towards reconciliation and reconstruction. Also, since Nepal has not established 
a new constitution within the time frame mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA), the central government is deadlocked with disorganization at all levels. Despite the LPCs 
working under this dysfunction, they provide structure within the community as they are made 
up of members from different political parties, ethnic groups and genders. Unfortunately, if or 
when a constitution is ratified, the LPCs will, as stated by the Terms of Reference (TOR), “be 
dissolved after the enforcement of the new constitution to be framed by the Constituent 
Assembly” (2009 (2065), p. 1). Considering the instability of the country and the infrequency of 
national consensus, it may not be beneficial to dismantle the only body arriving at consensus and 
promoting peace.  
Theoretical Frameworks 
Literature Review  
When conflict occurs it needs to be transformed rather than resolved or managed. 
Because conflict is complex one theory cannot explain every aspect. Theories within CT 
“assume(s) that conflict is caused by real problems of inequality and injustice expressed by 
competing social, cultural and economic frameworks” (Fisher, et al., 2000, p. 8). The 
overarching goals of these theories are based on the need to change structures that are causing 
inequalities and injustices. Some of these goals include economic redistribution to improve 
longer-term relationships and understandings between the conflicted parties, and to develop 
processes promoting empowerment, justice, peace, forgiveness, reconciliation, and recognition
4
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(Fisher, et al., 2000).  In Nepal, there are several theories relevant to reach respective goals 
towards peace.   
Lederach’s integrated approach to building peace is useful. He outlines peacebuilding as 
requiring both top-down and bottom-up leadership through three levels in his conflict 
transformation triangle or pyramid (Lederach, 1997, p. 39). Track I refers to diplomacy, includes 
military, political or religious leaders of high importance. Approaches at this level focus on high-
level negotiations, cease-fire agreements and peace talks. Track II refers to middle-range 
leadership including academics, intellectuals and members from civil society. Approaches at this 
level include problem-solving workshops, trainings or peace commissions. Track III includes 
local leaders, community developers and leaders within the indigenous community. The Local 
Peace Committees are considered part of Track III approach to peacebuilding but crossover to 
Track II because committees are at both the district and village levels in Nepal. 
When looking specifically at the local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Human Needs 
and Social Identity Theories are used in analyzing the effects of conflict alongside theories of 
Conflict Transformation (CT). Human Needs Theory states conflict arises because basic human 
needs are frustrated or are otherwise not being met (Fisher, et al., 2000). Basic human needs can 
be physical, psychological, or societal describing the need for security, recognition, identity, 
participation, and autonomy (Burton, 1990). The latter three pertain directly to Nepal in that 
identity, participation and autonomy are the most pertinent needs within the current context. 
Social Identity Theory postulates that conflict is caused when one’s identity is threatened often 
rooted in unresolved past loss or sufferings (Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, 2005). When part 
of one’s identity is targeted that part becomes overwhelmingly powerful. One is therefore 
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incapable of being able to fully develop their other (whole) identity. As such, it is hard to see 
people in the fullness of all their identities (Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, 2005).  
Human Needs and Social Identity theories are important in understanding the connection 
to CT.  The assumptions of these theories directly relate to the specific goals and responsibilities 
of the LPCs. The goals are as follows: 
Human Needs Theory: 
 To assist conflicting parties to identify and share their unmet needs, and generate 
options for meeting those needs 
 For the parties to reach agreements that meet the basic human needs of all the sides 
Social Identity Theory: 
 Through facilitated workshops and dialogue; for conflicting parties to identify threats 
and fears they each feel and to build empathy and reconciliation between themselves. 
 To jointly reach agreements that recognize the core identity needs of all parties.  
(Fisher, et al., 2000)  
 
Human Needs and Social Identity Theories help us to understand how to transform violent 
conflict by assisting the conflicting parties to come together, dialogue about unmet needs, threats 
and fears, and to build understanding and empathy towards agreements that recognize basic 
human and identity needs.  LPCs assist conflicting parties to identify their needs, threats and 
fears, and to reach mutual agreements through dialogues.  
Similar to the goals within the Human Needs and Social Identity theories, Lederach’s 
Strategic Peacebuilding model examines three major pathways of strategic peacebuilding: 
Violence Prevention, Conflict Response and Transformation; Justice and Healing; and Structural 
and Institutional Change and Development (Lederach & Mansfield, 2012).  Dialogue and 
conflict resolution strategies are located within the violence prevention pathway.  The formation 
of Local Peace Committees in Nepal is one approach falling within the Violence Prevention, 
Conflict Response and Transformation pathway providing dialogue/conflict resolution strategies 
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and non-violent social change via government and multi-lateral efforts. The LPCs use these 
strategies to facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political or 
social conflict, working on reconciliation, healing and trust-building at the local level.  If goals 
are met, then relationships are built increasing communication and trust between conflicting 
parties.  Conflict is essentially transformed hopefully preventing future conflicts. 
Peace committees are not new. Many post-conflict societies have implemented similar 
strategies at the local level to build peace after violent conflicts. In Kenya, Adan and Pkalya 
(2006) analyzed peace committees establishing the Wajir Peace and Development Committee 
(WPDC) in 1995. They noted many challenges the committees faced in Kenya including 
legitimacy, funding, volunteerism, ethnic and political interferences. Despite these challenges, 
the peace committees were successful in filling the void of traditional mediation practices. Two 
Nepali scholars who have done extensive research on their country’s own traditional conflict 
resolution practices are Dev Raj Dahal and Chandra Dev Bhatta. In their article, The Relevance 
of Local Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for Systemic Conflict Transformation in Nepal (2008) 
they outline several responses to conflict at the local level including formal institutions, 
traditional and religious approaches, as well as community mediation and civil society 
negotiation. One example is the “indigenous institutions such as Gram Parishad (Village 
Council) used to organize a discussion to mediate conflict. They used to take the perspective of 
all conflicting sides, find identity of interests, construct a solution and legitimize this by sacred 
dharma (institutional duties) interlinked with custom and morality” (2008, pp. 15-16).    
However, many believe that LPCs have no value or are not legitimate bodies for 
establishing peace because they are too modern and deviate from traditional practices. Aside 
from traditional mediation practices that Dahal discusses there are  Track I approaches to 
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peacebuilding that include more diplomatic interventions. These however are limited in scope 
and often fail if not implemented correctly as many peace accords signed do not hold up years 
later and there is a re-escalation of violence. If peace is not grounded within the communities 
engaging in the violence and affected by its consequences, then sustainable peace will not be 
achieved.  This is the essence of what locally-based peacebuilding practices are trying to achieve.  
Many scholars and practitioners within the PB and CT
5
 fields have explored issues 
around the use of local peace structures as part of the overall peace process needed in post-
conflict societies. Local peacebuilding has more recently been advocated but only after a select 
few have argued for their legitimacy. Paul Risley and Timothy Sisk (2005) wrote Democracy 
and United Nations Peace-building at the Local Level: Lessons Learned trying to call to 
attention the effectiveness of local, bottom-up, peacebuilding strategies. Yet connecting the 
resources of the international community to the local needs of those affected by war has been 
largely the challenge. Local peacebuilding structures can aid in bridging the gap often found in 
post-conflict societies by supporting the local communities implementing transitional 
government processes (Odendaal, 2008).  
Odendaal examined processes of other countries that established peace committees to 
mitigate conflicts and create more sustainable peace within society. He describes these processes 
as Local Peace-building Forums (LPFs), arguing that “local peacebuilding strategies, if done 
well, have the potential to anchor the peace process locally. They enable local communities to 
engage with those problems or issues uppermost in their minds and to inform the national 
process” (Odendaal, 2008, p. 3). Local ownership counters the exclusive nature of elite pacts, 
reduces violence, and creates a democratic process from within joint-problem solving processes.  
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The LPFs consist of all local political stakeholders, government officials, civil society 
and “have a mandate to secure peace locally and prevent further violence” (Odendaal, 2008, p. 
3). While they have proven to enhance tolerance and reduce violence “their potential is not fully 
realized because of a lack of scrutiny and rigorous assessment of appropriate methodology. Their 
contribution to peace-building is not being considered sufficiently in serious literature, with the 
result that little collective learning is taking place” (Odendaal, 2008, p. 3).  
Odendaal envisions a specific methodology for effective LPF implementation:  
1. National mandate needed but not necessary depending on the context. National mandates 
should confer legitimacy and credibility to LPFs and formalize lines of communication 
with the national leadership.  
2. The LPF needs to be composed of all stakeholders in the conflict including local political 
leaders as well as people committed to peace and those from civil society.  
3. LPFs should not have the power of arbitration, but rely exclusively on the ‘soft’ 
approaches to dispute resolution such as dialogue, confidence-building, facilitation or 
mediation to provide inclusive dialogue in a non-threatening space.  
4. LPFs should receive sustained, professional support in the following areas:  facilitation, 
orientation regarding roles expected of them and skills in performing those roles, and 
logistical support structure from the national level that is established as part of the 
national peace infrastructure.  
Odendaal warns, however, that LPFs cannot enforce peace through forcible means because this 
would negate their soft approaches to peacemaking. The LPFs also will find it extremely difficult 
to implement peace agreements if there is lack of political will to do so at the national level. Ball 
states (as cited in Odendaal A. , 2008, p. 7), who worked with peace committees in South Africa, 
that if any stakeholders lack commitment to a national peace agreement, the LPFs cannot be 
expected to be successful. Similarly, LPFs cannot address the root causes of a conflict if those 
causes are located in the national constitution, laws and policies. Odendaal continues to say that 
LPFs have been accused of facilitating negative peace by addressing only the symptoms and not 
causes of the conflict. This is real life fear for Nepalis in their current state.  
13 
 
In an interview with the founder of peace studies, Johan Galtung said Nepalis have a 
capacity for negative peace. “The 10-year-long conflict was a testament to their potential for 
excessive violence, while during the 18 days of Jana Andolan II in 2006, they toppled a 240-
year-old monarchy without resorting to violence.” He continues to say that “Nepalis are 
specifically good at negative forms of non-violence like civil disobedience, demonstrations, and 
non-cooperation, but they struggle when it comes to positive non-violence, like nation building 
and constructive actions towards peace” (Galtung, 2012). And while the LPCs cannot directly 
control the national debate on the nature of peace, they can and are, mandated to recommend and 
pressure local leaders to change policy at the national level (Terms of Reference, Local Peace 
Committees, 2009 (2065)). The peace process should balance the national level issues of 
constitution-making, state restructuring, and power-sharing with the local level issues that 
ground the peace processes and provide access to resources and compensation to conflict-
affected peoples.  
While the effectiveness of LPCs is unclear, the impact of the peace committees and their 
use of dialogue/conflict resolution strategies on the greater national peace process in Nepal are 
significant. However, one main critique of the overall peace process is that Conflict 
Transformation has not been able to grow from the micro level because there is no system in 
place linking it to the macro level. “The peace process has been strained by the irresolution of the 
old problems such as weak governance, absence of state security in the peripheral areas, 
economic volatility, poverty, high unemployment, poor education, discrimination, distributional 
struggle of social forces and inaction of the state to cope with political violence generated by 
non-state actors” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 7).  The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) 
outlines the need to eliminate old problems and mandates the establishment of institutions to 
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implement new programs, the peace committees being one such program. However, without the 
central government upholding the CPA, these changes cannot occur. If the CPA cannot 
effectively bring about sustainable peace in Nepal by creating national initiatives then the 
success of LPCs should not be expected to succeed either. Since the government has yet to 
establish any national initiatives, “It could be said that the CPA itself is not sufficiently 
comprehensive, as it did not address the grievances of those political parties and societal groups 
who are outside the SPA [Seven Party Alliance] framework” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 27). The 
inconsistent lack of decisions being made by the government about the future of the LPCs and 
other peace strategies within the CPA is inhibiting the collaboration of macro level processes 
with the local level processes.  
Another critique is that the peace process has been too politicized on a national level, 
especially when it comes to LPCs.  Immediately after signing the peace accord and while 
integrating the Maoists into the government allowed violence to cease, their involvement in the 
political process is now hindering forward progress in the CA towards the writing of a 
constitution. Political deadlock and monopoly make the LPCs incapable of functioning to fulfill 
their mandates. This is largely due to the CPA being ineffective due to the political deadlock at 
the center of other political processes. “This is the reason peace movement of Track II and Track 
III civil society actors have become essential to unfreeze the peace accord” (Dahal R. D., 2010, 
p. 10). One aspect of this deadlock is political nepotism when disbursing monetary funds to the 
committees. When funds were first given to victims, the lists favored those with ties to political 
party members, who often times were family members. Additionally, compensation forms are 
difficult to complete; as many victims are illiterate. Ultimately, the people affected do not get the 




The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) institutionalized the peace process at the 
national level after the violence ended. Even though there is no direct connection between the 
CPA and LPCs, both are designed to support and aid building peace, with the CPA being the 
means by which to solve the problems causing the conflict. Nepal’s conflict can be described as 
ethno-political (Bhatta, 2012). The political instability of the country shows its inability to come 
to consensus, especially around issues of governance, state restructuring and federalism. “The 
impact of Nepal’s culture of impunity and political patronage is pervasive in public life” (Bhatta, 
2012, p. 3). Unfortunately, it seems as though the ethnic part of it is being politicized and used to 
further divide the country and control power. This is not unusual in post-conflict societies and is 
often seen as a “rational choice approach in which individuals, especially among elites, [can] use 
ethnicity for political benefit” (Jesse & Williams, 2011, p. 12).  
Ethnic-federalism in Nepal is a sticking point to achieving consensus. Some believe that 
federalism will solve the political and social problems with the writing of a new constitution, but 
most Nepalis do not know the meaning of federalism or are aware of what is happening in the 
capital, Kathmandu.
6
 It has also been said that ethnic-federalism, the dividing up of the country 
into autonomous regions based on ethnic boundaries for proportional rights, can help give rights 
to those who currently have none due to the current caste system and discrimination. It is unclear 
how this will look, as it has not yet been decided how the country is going to restructure the 
state. Caste and class discrimination, especially for Dalits and women, is still prevalent. 
                                                   
6
 Watch The People’s Constitution for more on Nepali’s view of the constitution and Constituent 
Assembly. There are several quotes from various groups about their views of the government, the 
constitution-writing process, and overall socio-political climate in Nepal.  
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Closely connected to the lack of human rights is the overall oppression and 
marginalization of groups (indigenous, various ethnic groups i.e. Tibetan refugees, Hindu caste, 
women, youth). Social identity theory explains this oppression as a potential cause for conflict, 
and as we have seen in Nepal for decades, there are ethnic/caste-based discrimination which is 
one root-cause of the armed violence. Identity-based groups have currently been created to 
counter this discrimination, but the lack of consensus on the definition of federalism in the 
constitution are causing conflicting demands. Conditions are more volatile than they previously 
were because this type of conflict based on social categories (e.g. ethnic grouping) strikes at the 
core of a person’s self and identity which is difficult for affected individuals to overcome.  
 There has also been a lack of land rights associated with the feudal land system. For 
example, in the western region of the Terai the Kamaiya (long term farm labor) system still uses 
indentured slavery to work the land (Sharma S. , 1999). When the US sprayed DDT in the lower 
region to rid the area of Malaria, the hill people (Palali) migrated to that region. This created 
conflict between two ethnic groups because the Madhesi people, 50% of whom have traditionally 
lived in this area, look more Indian and have historically been marginalized by the hill people. 
National land rights given in the new constitution would hopefully mitigate this conflict.  
A major part of analyzing the complexities of this conflict is reviewing the CPA within 
the current context of Nepal’s events and whether the CPA is being followed by all actors who 
signed it. The CPA is extensive, but thus far, it has accomplished five main goals, which has 
implications for the post-conflict society. First, it ended hostilities between the Maoists and the 





 party to join the government. Following the signing of the CPA, the UNMIN (United 
Nations Mission in Nepal) was established, to ensure the integration of the two military forces, 
as well as monitoring preparations for the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. This 
integration of the Maoist Rebels into the National Army of Nepal meant it would be less likely 
that an armed conflict would subsequently occur. The integration of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) soldiers with the Nepali Army is seen as a major accomplishment towards peace.  
The CPA also established a commitment to follow Human Rights and International 
Human Law. Unfortunately, the government of Nepal has yet to create a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) or the Disappeared Inquiry Commission to display this 
commitment.  “Conflict victims had little hope of justice when Constituent Assembly (CA) was 
functioning. Agendas of the victims were completely over-shadowed following the dissolution of 
the CA…” (Pokhrel, 2012, para 3) Some view the TRC as a more legitimate way in which to 
start the reconciliation process of a country recovering from a violent conflict. And with the LPC 
unable to provide amnesty or reparations to the conflict victims, it seems as though the LPC is 
unable to contribute to the peace process. One journalist states her dislike for the overall process, 
“There is Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and Local Peace Committee (LPC) at the district 
level for promoting peace and harmony in the country. But in the absence of a clear government 
policy and a TRC, these two institutions have only been involved in distributing relief packages 
and are completely silent on a reconciliation process” (Pokhrel, Is the government promoting 
impunity?, 2012, para 5). Yet the peace committees are not completely silent in the peace 
process. They are trying to hold the country together until the government catches up and can 
sustain the inclusive system of the local level. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the government 
                                                   
7 See APPENDIX D: Nepal: Key People and Parties 
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establish a TRC to work with the LPCs to establish, investigate and seek justice for the victims 
of prior human rights abuses.  
Similarly, the CPA established a commitment to restructuring the Nepali state. This 
means assessing and adjusting the power dynamics between stakeholders, giving more 
representation to marginalized groups, and defining the margins of federalism. The CA 
committees were created with specific tasks and functions to make the process more systematic. 
The Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution of State Power created criteria for 
developing a new federal state in the Nepali constitution. However, the dissolution of the CA 
puts the country at another political stalemate. Without a clear definition of how the state is 
going to be restricted, the constitution will never come to fruition which is necessary for the 
peace process to continue. More decisively, “The demands for ethnic autonomy have become so 
strong that if they are not addressed they could lay the seeds for further conflict as happened in 
Sri Lanka and Aceh” (Sharma, Ethnic Tension, 2012, para 7). 
It is unknown whether the new CA election will actually occur in November 2013 given 
that other dates to create a new constitution have come and gone.  The Nepali people are 
disillusioned and seemingly without hope or trust in the government. One editor of the Nepal 
Samacharpatra, a daily newspaper, expressed his worry for the future, “The election will only 
add to the turmoil because the government did not take major political parties and all of its 
coalition partners into confidence” (Sharma, 2012, para 6). These failures to meet deadlines have 
created the current political stagnation on the issues of consensus around the number, names, and 
boundaries of the ethnic states and between ethnically-formed caucuses that break party lines and 
create conflict in government. It has also created a lack of hope in the government’s ability to 
follow-through with their promises.   
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Primary Research Question 
I am interested in whether the LPC members are fulfilling their mandate established by 
the 2006 CPA and the creation of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR). If not, 
why? Connecting this to the overall peace process in Nepal I am also interested in the additional 
questions: Are the LPCs using dialogue/conflict resolution strategies to create sustainable peace 
for Nepal? More specifically, how does this affect local peacebuilding efforts in Nepal as they 
continue to be in a state of transition towards a stable government? What are the implications of 
this transition on the local peacebuilding efforts? 
Local Peace Committee – Overview 
The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR) was established by the CPA with a 
mandate to create the LPCs at each district level. The LPCs were created to “overcome the 
conflict transformation and peace-building vacuum at Track II levels, execute CPA and 
institutionalize peace-building activities at the local level” 
8
 (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 25). The 
LPCs are able to create Village Level Peace Committees (VLPC) within the Village 
Development Committee (VDC) if they deem it necessary. There are 75 districts in Nepal and it 
is desired that each one have a peace committee. As of July 2009, there were 55 peace 
committees that had been created. Currently, there are 74 peace committees with one remote 
district in the far-eastern region lacking enough people to create one, which shows that there has 
                                                   
8
 The official structures of peace rest on Peace Negotiation Coordination and Advisory Committee 
(PNCAC) comprising 10 political parties representing parliament, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 
National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct for Ceasefire (NMCC), National Transition to Peace 
Initiative (NTTP), Interim Constitution Draft Committee (ICDC), Joint Monitoring and Coordination 
Committee (JMCC) on Cantonment Management which comprises UNMIN, CPN (Maoist) and Nepal 
Army and 11-member High Level Monitoring Committee (HLMC) to monitor the implementation of the 
understandings and agreements reached between SPA. (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008) For the purposes of this 
research I’ll only be focusing on the specific structures and mandate of the LPCs.   
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been significant improvement in establishing these peace committees but it is unclear whether 
they are functioning or not.     
The LPCs are comprised of 23 members, with one third of the committee members being 
female. More specifically, (a) only 12 members can be from the district working committees of 
the political parties having representation in the CA; (b) Four people must be from civil society, 
local organizations or human rights activists promoting peace; (c) Four must be representing the 
conflict-affected peoples; (d) One must be a member of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industries; (e) and two must be among the indigenous communities, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims, 
etc. who are not also represented in (a), (b), or (c) above (2009 (2065), pp. 2-3). 
Many of the LPCs have formed VDC level peace committees. In this case, the VDC 
Secretary or Executive Office of the Municipality also functions as the Village Level Peace 
Committee (VLPC) secretary whereas with the district level committee the secretary is assigned 
by the MOPR. Both peace committees select a coordinator to assist the secretary, a position 
established by consensus and rotated out every six months. At the VDC level there are only nine 
members of the committee, including at least two women, and they report every activity to the 
district level committee. While this formation is designed to provide inclusive participation  and 
local ownership it is problematic because nine members do not represent all groups within Nepal 
or even a given region. Because of this the government regulates the number of VLPCs whereas 
the district level simply add more people.  
While there are the formal stipulations to create the LPCs, there are many other 
intricacies and challenges that were not anticipated by TOR making it difficult for them to 
function as a committee. One of the primary functions of the LPCs is to coordinate with the local 
district bodies. Some external challenges include a lack of transparency, lack of coordination 
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with the CDO and MOPR, and a lack of resources. By public opinion, the LPCs are viewed as 
the only way in which families will receive victim compensation from the war. While this non-
descript role has been a positive outcome for the LPCs, it is unclear what happens when the 
victim compensation money runs out. It is not specifically written in the mandate as to the 
procedures for the distribution of funds. As such, there is a lot of ambiguity as to how this 
process should be accomplished within the LPCs.  
Internal challenges within the LPCs include political party interference with budget 
allocations not being based on group size and a lack of budget transparency. Additional 
challenges are ethnic and gender discrimination, and lack of education and language barriers 
preventing effective communication. So while the LPCs are mandated by the TOR to be 
inclusive and proportionally represent everyone, there is no guarantee that their voices are heard. 
In some cases one’s dialect may not be understood by everyone, in other cases individuals do not 
feel comfortable enough to speak up about their positions on the issues. The latter problem is 
especially prevalent for women and members of the Dalit communities.  
Goals and Objectives of LPCs 
The goals and objectives of the LPCs are established in the TOR. However, a report from 
Raja Ram Rijal, the LPC Secretary in Dhading said their five main objectives are: 
1. To reconcile the victims from the state and the rebel side 
2. To provide employment and income generation activities 
3. To provide educational support to conflict victims 
4. To run joint program among conflicting parties 
5. To expand LPC to the village level and initiate to resolve conflict existed at the local level. 
These objectives, while true, cuurently do not align with the stated objectives in Section (4) 
Duties and Responsibilities of the Local Peace Committees of the TOR.  The following are the 
objectives (adapted) of the LPCs as stated in the TOR:  
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4.1 Assist in the implementation of the CPA and promote the peace process 
4.2 Monitor the implementation of the Ministry’s Relief and Reconstruction Program 
4.3 Support the Task force for the collection of data on conflict affected individuals, families, 
and structures 
4.4 Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and 
social conflict 
4.5 Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building 
4.6 Monitor political and social developments at the local level 
4.7 Disseminate information on issues that affect local peace processes 
While some of the objectives stated by the LPC Secretary could in fact lie within the 
broader objectives mandated by the MOPR and Peace Secretariat, not all the objectives are the 
same. According to committee members, LPCs are mandated to provide monetary relief to 
conflict victims and displaced peoples, as well as return properties captured by Maoists 
insurgents. Further, one scholar found that LPCs aimed to “ensure return of properties captured 
by CPN (Maoist); look into resettlement and rehabilitation issues and promote the reconstruction 
of damaged infrastructure….” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 25)  Therefore, while providing 
monetary compensation is in fact part of the duties and responsibilities of the LPCs it should be 
more clearly stated as such rather than broadly describe as to give specific context to the types of 
activities needing to be implemented. 
Processes  
In the TOR the (5) Working Procedures for the Local Peace Committees outline the 
processes that enable the LPC to fulfill its mandate and achieve its objectives. The following is 
an adapted list of objectives: 
5.1 Create common agreement to implement strategies of peace process 
5.2 All decisions shall be made by consensus (if that is not possible then by majority of total 
members present) 
5.3 May use services of local or national facilitators 
5.4 May establish working relations with national or international monitors 
5.5 LPC and DDC, Municipality, VDC may exchange cooperation 
5.6 May forward issues to the Peace and Rehabilitation Commission for consultation 
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Similar to the objectives of the LPC, the specific processes are equally ambiguous and probably 
vary from district to district. In the Dhading district, there are specific activities implemented to 
fulfill their mandate. In the same report that Secretary Raja Ram Rijal wrote following the 
Mediation Training, he stated the following activities the committee produced last year:  
1. Establishment of VLPCs in 30 DCs 
2. Skill Development program for conflict victim families (computer training for 20 conflict 
victim persons) 
3. Radio Programs to strengthen peace process 
4. Interaction program with LPC members, Political parties and concerned civil societies on the 
‘Role and Challenges for LPC in Peacebuilding Process’ (60 representatives, twice) 
5. Essay competition on the topic ‘Role of Youths in Peace process’ among secondary level 
students 
6. Interaction Program with the participation of  LPC members, VLPC coordinators, female 
members and VDC secretary on the topic ‘Role of Peace Committees in Peacebuilding 
Process’ 
7. Street Drama on the Peace theme (twice) 
There have also been additional efforts to mitigate the external challenges that the LPCs face and 
to create more Village Level Peace Committees (VLPC) to reach a wider group of people within 
the villages. Rijal said, 
“Efforts have also been made to establish an office of VLPCs. To be more transparent on the 
relief amount allocated by the government for the conflict victims and to ensure that the actual 
conflict victims are recommended for the packages, more roles and responsibilities are given to 
VLPCs. Similarly district LPC are also planning for educational visit to observe the activities 
done by LPCs of other districts.” 
While this is a good start, the LPCs have a long way to go to create transparency within 
the government at the local level. The interaction program which gathers the desired group 
together to interact on the topic given is a good way to create common agreement for the 
implementation of peace strategies. At the national level, decision-making via consensus is a 
challenge especially in relation to the CA and the terms of federalism in the constitution. “The 
need for consensus building processes that reinforces trust between government and people 
cannot be compromised even by the need for political institutions to act as quickly as possible” 
(Joshi, 2009, p. 101). If consensus is not reached at the national level it will be equally as 
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difficult for the local level to come to consensus on the same issues, “assuming that local leaders 
have the ability, knowledge and interest to address these types of conflicts” (Dahal & Bhatta, 
2008, p. 26). This isn’t happening by the leaders of the Local Peace Committees as issues of 
reaching consensus within the committees is a challenge that is directly related to the national 
level’s ability to come to consensus. 
Members are mandated to recommend cases to the national level that cannot be solved at 
the local level. This communication is important towards facilitating working relationships with 
the national and international monitors to prevent any crisis or potential for violence. 
Additionally, there is a responsibility to communicate signed agreements between political 
parties and the central government to the LPCs “which are related to peace and conflict 
resolution process, to the local level” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 26). It is unclear whether 
information is being communicated to LPCs and if LPCs are aware of the responsibility to turn 
unresolved cases over to the national government. This is the basis of the research. 
Most of the LPC processes relate to peacebuilding and the use of dialogical/conflict 
resolution strategies. Given my exposure to mediation as dialogical strategy, I was able to see 
how these processes affected the committees. “The idea of facilitated dialogue as a response to 
conflicts, often understood in simple terms and provided by wise people whose impartiality and 
decency were considered central, has been an integral part of Nepali social tradition, and various 
of these traditional forms can still be found today” (Lederach & Thapa, 2012, p. 3). Since LPCs 
may play the role of mediator or facilitator, there has been a focus on mediation as a process for 
peacebuilding at the local level. Trainings in mediation skills have been provided to LPC 
members through collaborative efforts between CPRP and CSSP. Now we see an interesting mix 
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of newer forms of mediation (Integrative)
9
 with traditional systems of conflict resolution 
(Arbitration).  “Thakalis, Magars and Tharus have traditional institutions that continue to 
function, such as heads of villages, or (ethnic) community organizations such as mukhiya, 
mahato or badghar” (Lederach & Thapa, 2012, p. 3). Most of these traditional forms were 
abolished in the 1960s but some are still used today and some disputes are referred to the VDC 
which is often the only local body of governance in the remote areas of Nepal.  
Mediation is often used within the committees and local agencies as there are several 
barriers the LPC encounter when working in the community. While the LPCs can work with 
local bodies (CDO, DDC, and VDC) they cannot make any decisions that conflict with these 
bodies. During the mediation training, one man said that while the government provides training 
to LPCs, it is useless because the CDO has all the power to deny requests or refuse to cooperate 
if they don’t agree. The CDO does not always accept the functions mandated of the LPC. The 
CDO makes the final decision about what programs are implemented, which is problematic for 
the LPCs who need to coordinate with the CDO to conduct their programs. Members of this LPC 
cited two instances of allotting Nepalese Rupees for “displaced peoples” but since their 
documentation did not contain the language “conflict victims” the money went back to MOPR 
because they could not reach consensus on the appropriate language.  
Awareness and acceptance of LPC needs to be realized before they can be an effective 
mechanism for promoting peace and democracy at the local level. If the CDO does not recognize 
or respect the work that the LPCs are doing, then the community will not either. People within 
the Dhading community are not aware of the purpose of the LPCs or its capabilities for assisting 
in solving their conflicts. Therefore, the LPCs are not being utilized in the way they were 
                                                   
9
 See CSSP website for more on their approach to Mediation. www.cssp.org  
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initially designed. Whether this is due to structural challenges, communication issues, lack of 
resources or lack of advocacy, it needs to change in order for their processes to be effective.  
Monitoring/Evaluation  
When the CPA was signed it effectively dissolved the National Monitoring Committee on 
the Code of Conduct for the Ceasefire (NMCC) which was the only body mandated to monitor 
the ceasefire. It also dissolved the Peace Secretariat which was involved in the all peace 
negotiations leading to the peace accord.
10
 The Peace Secretariat transformed into what is now 
the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. As such it took over responsibility for many 
transitional peace processes once the CPA was signed. The MOPR is the core Ministry 
responsible for the overall operation of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF). As the overseeing 
government agency of the LPCs, because of its role in helping create the committees, the MOPR 
is responsible for monitoring the duties and responsibilities of the LPCs. Part of their mandate is 
the “Formulation implementation, monitoring and evaluation of immediate and long-term 
policies, strategies, plans and programs for the establishment of peace, conflict management and 
reconstruction of physical infrastructures damaged due to conflict” (Reconstruction, 2013), and 
as the Local Peace Committees is one such program it is the MOPR’s responsibility to monitor 
and evaluate their progress.  
Conversely, the LPCs are supposed to “To monitor the implementation of the Ministry’s 
relief and reconstruction programs” (Terms of Reference, Local Peace Committees, 2009 (2065), 
p. 5), though there is no specification as to how this done. I was unable to find specific reports 
from the MOPR regarding the progress of their monitoring of the LPCs.  
                                                   
10
 See APPENDIX C: History of Peace Negotiation Talks (prior to CPA) 
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I did, however, find adequate information about the NPTF with more information as to 
the monitoring of programs. The NPTF, which funds the reconstruction and peace efforts under 
the Ministry of Peace, was created in February of 2007 after the CPA and seems to be the only 
form of monitoring that exists within the government reporting on the LPCs progress. Their 
monitoring and evaluation strategy are used to follow the money within the projects that the 
MOPR implements, including the LPCs and their programs. There are four major projects 
(clusters) the MOPR are currently conducting, and as of January 2013, the NPTF has financed 
55 projects within its four clusters (Government of Nepal, 2009): 
 Cluster I: Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants 
 Cluster II: Conflict Affected People (IDP in particular) and Communities 
 Cluster III: Security and Transitional Justice 
Cluster IV: Constituent Assembly and Peace Building Initiatives at national and local levels 
 
The specific project within the fourth cluster that pertains to the LPCs is entitled 
Strengthening Local Peace Committees: Peace with the bottom-up approach. This program’s 
goal is to strengthen the capacities of the LPCs as “effective, autonomous local peace structures” 
yet there have been limited achievements as of April 2012 including “Training institutes are 
being selected and training manuals are under preparation” and “Procurement of logistics is 
completed” (Nepal S. W., 2012, p. 1). The project is funded until July of 2013 but only started in 
February of 2011 (Nepal S. W., 2012). It has taken almost five years for funding and support to 
reach the districts and with 75 districts and LPCs, it suggests a challenge of what can be covered 
in the time remaining. The reports will show that resources are limited and challenges are 
seemingly boundless. Reports also show that wider awareness of LPCs are providing access to 
support for conflict-affected peoples (CAP), the LPCs continue to be adversely affected by 
political interference and the lack of conflict sensitivity skills among the members, which limits 
their effectiveness and limited resources (Nepal S. W., 2011). As part of the NPTF, an external 
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monitoring process produced a report discussing the outcomes of all the cluster projects. Some 
findings include the following: 
 The LPC at the district level need to strengthen to improve their quality of services to CAP. For 
example, many of its staff, including the Secretaries, was not aware on how to deal with complex 
and sensitive situations such as when there is overwhelming pressure from the CAP seeking 
assistance. The monitoring team noted that LPC team to behave inappropriately to the CAP 
approaching LPC for support. 
 The complex and lengthy application and verification process for CAP relief support does not 
match with the staff resources assigned by the implementing agencies, particularly at the DAO, to 
process the applications. 
(Nepal S. W., 2011, pp. 30-31) 
These are some of the main challenges the LPCs still face despite years of working with 
the MOPR more concretely to mitigate these issues. There have been numerous 
recommendations to strengthen their capacity. Examples of conflict sensitive trainings in order to 
approach conflict-affected peoples (CAP) in a more supportive way are suggested time and time 
again.  Yet even with these challenges some LPCs have been effective. A peaceful political 
environment and reduced local conflict has been achieved in areas where LPCs are proactive and 
have political consensus. However, the opposite is true when these things are lacking in the local 
environment.  
The MOPR is a governmental institution accountable to the people of Nepal and should 
have its efforts monitored and evaluated regularly. Without this monitoring, peace cannot be 
sustained. Changes are needed to address the needs and demands of the local peoples in order for 
these goals and objectives to be achieved. The NPTF seems to working well with the MOPR to 
monitor its projects greater coordination and communication between the MOPR and the LPCs 
needs to occur since they are in direct contact with the CAPs and IDPs (Internally Displaced 
Peoples) needing the access and resources that the funding is supposed flow to. While the MOPR 
is required to submit biannual reports on the status of its projects, as well as their budgets and 
accounts, the lack of computers or the internet by everyday citizens hinders their effect, 
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especially in the VDC rural areas. Budget transparency also needs to be increased among the 
LPC members within the committees themselves. 
Research Methods 
Practitioner Inquiry Design  
This is a qualitative case study using in-depth surveys framed within my knowledge and 
experiences working with peace committee members who participated in a training conducted by 
CPRP. In order to research this population, flexible techniques were needed (Rossman & Rallis, 
2003). Flexibility comes from wanting to investigate the overall effectiveness of the peace 
committees and their effect on the larger phenomenon of peace at the national level, but not 
being able to survey more than a single district. Cultural differences between Nepal and the US 
also required greater flexibility in research methods to allow for data to be obtained through 
impersonal conversations, informal interviews, observations from the trainings  as well as the 
relevant literature.  Literature on LPCs come from newspaper articles, books, and online 
resources to supplement my research and obtain an overall understanding of Nepal’s post-
conflict reconstruction and current political climate.  
Data Collection/Methodology 
Data come from a questionnaire created and translated into Sanskrit for the Dhading 
District LPC members in Nepal. Developed within the theoretical frameworks of Human Needs, 
Social Identity and Conflict Transformation theories, survey questions asked about committee 
members’ experiences within the LPC and CLPC including how committees resolved conflicts 
both internally and externally and between their networks such as the MOPR, the CDO, and 
other peace committees. Questions also surveyed the participant’s satisfaction with their ability 
to mediate conflicts, the communication and relationship levels between these networks and their 
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overall contribution to peace in Nepal.
11
 Survey methods were chosen because of my language 
barrier as I did not speak Nepali and my financial inability to hire a translator for numerous in-
depth interviews.  
Data were collected after a CPRP-sponsored Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation 
Training for the CLPCs of the Dhading district. Since the training was for CLPC members this 
sample was surveyed first (n=26). The CLPC members were administered their survey directly 
after the second-to-last day of training with instructions to return the completed survey the 
following day. Twenty-three CLPC members returned the questionnaire on the last day of the 
training. The second sample includes the district LPC members of the Dhading (n=23). Nine 
LPC members were administered their survey in an informal meeting later that day with 
instructions to complete and return to the district secretary. Some additional surveys were left for 
the remaining district LPC members who were not able to be present at that meeting. Twelve 
surveys from LPC members were returned to me in Kathmandu two weeks later by the district 
LPC Secretary. 
Data were coded and analyzed using SPSS 21. Open-ended data were categorized and 
assigned values based upon the themes emerging from respondents’ answers. Using both forced-
choice and open-ended responses, t-test were conducted to examine differences between gender, 
ethnicity and political affiliation. However, data failed to yield any significant results.  
Findings 
Presentation of Data  
Because the response rate was low at the district level, data were not sufficient to present 
each of the two committee levels alone and then compare. As a result, survey data from the 
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 See APPENDIX E: Survey Questionnaire for the complete questionnaire administered (in English). 
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village level (n=23) and district level (n=12) are combined; findings are grouped into themes. 
Where appropriate a distinction is made between village and district level findings.  
Understanding and Awareness of Mandate 
 One of my initial research questions was “Are the LPC members fulfilling their mandate 
established by the 2006 CPA and the creation of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 
(MOPR)?” I asked the participants some questions around whether or not they read the TOR and 
the respondent’s knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the committees. When asked if 
participants had read the Terms of Reference (TOR) the responses varied. At the district level, 
the majority of those surveyed, 8 out of 12 (or 66.7%) said they had read the TOR. At the village 
level, 14 out of 23 (or 60.9%) said they had not read the TOR.  
 Another aspect of understanding their mandate is being able to identify the processes by 
which they were able to complete the duties and responsibilities given. When I asked members to 
select the duties and responsibilities their committee had participated in the respondents 
identified that they had in fact participated in the various duties and responsibilities but they 
were not able to elaborate as to how they were able to accomplish these duties. The CLPC has 
participated in “Working towards reconciliation, healing and trust building” the most with 73.9% 
selecting. 56.5% of members selected “Supporting the task force constituted by the Government 
of Nepal for the collection of the data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures” 
as another duty their committee participated in. The LPC has been able to “Disseminate 
information on issues that affect local peace processes” and “Work on reconciliation, healing and 
trust building” with 75% of members saying their committee has participated in these duties. 
They have also been able to “Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in 




 Part of the overall peace process requires inclusion of the various ethnic groups who have 
historically been discriminated against and to give them more representation within the 
government. The LPCs have to adhere to the requirements of the CPA dictating inclusiveness. 
The main requirements include 33% participation from women, representation of members from 
conflict-affected peoples, as well as various ethnic groups. When I asked various demographic 
questions to see if this inclusiveness was occurring, results suggest it was occurring. In terms of 
gender there is in fact 1/3 female membership within the CLPC with 8 out of the total 23 
participants surveyed or 34%. Since I received nearly full participation from the CLPC this is a 
more accurate measure of the female participation within the committee. Within the LPC, I was 
unable to obtain more participation but out of the 12 surveyed there were 3 women, representing 
25% participation, but my knowledge of the composition of the committee, I know there is 1/3 
female membership within the district level as well.  
 In terms of ethnicity, they are members from several members of different ethnic groups 
including one Dalit member and two members self-identifying as Janajatis. The majority of 
members were Chetris or Newars with five members each. Unfortunately, there were several 
who didn’t respond to this question making it impossible to know if any other major ethnic 
groups are represented. The lack of sufficient numbers at the district level makes estimates of 
inclusiveness impossible. While these demographic questions were needed to identify if the 
committees were inclusive based on percentages, it does not allow me to say whether the 
committee is inclusive, nor does it allow for me to say how well the committee functions. 
Participants were also asked if they would describe their committee as being inclusive towards 
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all or a majority of the various ethnic groups, the results were varied. Descriptions of the 
relationship between ethnic groups are as follows: 
“We, not because of caste and religion and culture, but because we are Nepali, we stay together 
and work together. There is not caste partiality among us.” 
“In committee, all political parties, Janajati, Dalit and women need to be included to make it 
strong.”   
“Ethnicity and caste system are all fake. We all are human and we should know that. 
Empowerment through knowledge and economy should be promoted.” 
 
While the descriptions could be coded as positive responses it is deceiving to the rest of the data 
which shows a negative satisfaction with the relationship between ethnic groups and consensus 
reached.  
 At the district level, there was not enough participation to see whether members thought 
the committee was inclusive, 25% said no, 33.3% said yes and 41.7% did not answer. At the 
village level, almost half of those surveyed, 47.8% of members said they did not think their 
committee was inclusive towards a majority or all the ethnic groups while 21.7% said yes it was 
inclusive. Three members of the CLPC said they were not at all satisfied with the relationship 
nor the level of consensus reached between the ethnic groups. If a few are not satisfied then 
things need to be done to have everyone be satisfied with the relationship between ethnic groups. 
If not, inclusiveness cannot truly be reached within these committees. 26.1% of members were 
somewhat satisfied with ethnic relations and 30.4% were somewhat satisfied with the level of 
consensus reached by ethnic groups but the overall trend among the data suggest that members 
of the committee were not extremely satisfied with the ethnic inclusion in the committees. 
Whether this negates the actual inclusive nature of the committee is hard to say but the 
challenges of inclusivity make it difficult for the committees to function properly and be 
effective in resolving disputes.    
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 Another aspect of inclusivity is political participation. Having all stakeholders involved 
in the committee is another mandate of the TOR. All LPC members surveyed said they were 
politically affiliated. Nineteen out of the twenty-three surveyed CLPC members said they were 
politically affiliated. When asked which political parties they were affiliated with the participants 
all identified the current major political parties in in the country.
12
 Even if members were 
politically affiliated it is interesting whether they were approached by political parties to be 
involved in the peace committees. When asked how participants became part of the peace 
committees, overwhelmingly members were encouraged by a political party to be part of the 
committee. At the district level, 7 out of the 12 surveyed said they became part of the committee 
due to political party involvement.  Some members at the village level, 9 out of the 23 surveyed, 
were approached by political parties to become involved with the local peace committees. 
Explaining this one participant said “There is representation from every party in the committee 
so since I am the chairperson of the party, I became involved in this committee. The DAO and 
VDC Duwakot has requested this.”  
While the peace committees are designed to include political party members, they are not 
necessarily designed to include members encouraged by political parties. Even those who were 
part of the civil society were designated by political parties to be in the local peace committee. 
One participant said, “Since I am involved in social service I was told by the representative from 
the Nepali Communist Party UML to be involved in the local peace committee.” Yet there were 
four responses of those who were not approached by any political party, or a political party 
member, but wanted to be involved in the peace committees. One participant said, “No one made 
                                                   
12
 See APPENDIX D: Nepal: Key people and parties 
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any suggestions to me about this but because I am in social services and want the best for people, 
I got involved by my own wish.”  
Use of dialogue/conflict resolution strategies 
 The use of dialogue and conflict resolution skills is one of the main strategies that the 
peace committees use to create peace within the communities. Another question asked was: Are 
LPCs using dialogue/conflict resolution strategies to create sustainable peace for Nepal? To 
answer this, questions in the survey were designed to measure if 1) these processes were used 
and 2) if committee members were satisfied with their use. The data shows the committees do in 
fact participate in conflict transformation processes in order to achieve the responsibilities 
outlined by the terms of reference. Both committees stated they participated in the responsibility 
to “facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social 
conflict.” Therefore, these processes are used yet whether they are effective and if members are 
satisfied is a different discussion. When asked if participants were satisfied with their 
committee’s ability to use mediation skills to resolve conflicts, a majority had positive 
satisfaction ratings. Within the CLPC 26.1% said they were somewhat satisfied, 17.4% were very 
satisfied, and 26.1% said they were extremely satisfied (69.6% total) with their committee’s 
ability to use mediation skills. Within the LPC, 41.7% said they were a little or somewhat 
satisfied with their ability to use their mediation skills with 25% of those saying they were very 
satisfied.  
When asked about the satisfaction of their role in reducing conflict in the district through 
these processes a majority of responses were positive. At the village level, 39.1% said they were 
somewhat satisfied with their role in reducing conflict in the district. 30.4% said they were very 
satisfied and 13% said they were extremely satisfied. They were as satisfied at the district level, 
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partially due to lack of participation, but 25% of those surveyed said they were very satisfied 
with their role in reducing conflict in the district. 
While committee members may feel somewhat to extremely satisfied about their role in 
reducing conflict in the district or to use their mediation skills in reducing that conflict, there are 
still challenges they face, both internal and external, that make this process difficult. One such 
difficulty is the lack of training in mediation is one of the most important internal challenges 
both levels of peace committees faced. At both levels large numbers of respondents said that the 
lack of mediation trainings was an extremely important challenge, 43.5% and 33.3% at the 
village and district levels, respectively.  
Another aspect of dialogue as a strategy is not just within the community, but within the 
peace committees themselves. We can see that a main internal challenge was the lack of training 
among members in mediation that affected their ability to communicate within the committee 
and to achieve consensus. When I asked participants how quickly they come to consensus on a 
given issue, respondents said, on a scale from 1 to 5 with one being never and five being always, 
56.5%  of village level respondents indicate that they sometimes reach consensus. At the district 
level only 41.7% reported they sometimes can quickly reach consensus with another 25% saying 
they seldom can reach consensus quickly.  
When internal challenges come up, the majority of the time members’ use 
dialogue/conflict resolution strategies to reach an agreement. Of the participants answering this 
question, half indicate that they engage in a discussion to resolve internal challenges, “Discussed 
by sitting with each other and talking about how to tackle the problem and how to go about it .” If 
a discussion was not used, an outside mediator might be used to assist in achieving consensus 
among members. As one respondent pointed out, “Also, in case of a failure to make an 
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agreement, an outside mediator can be taken and help from administration department or 
organization can be used.”   
Top-Down Support for the Peace Committees 
 Part of assessing the effectiveness of the peace committees is to understand the 
relationship between peace committee and the networks that oversee its functions and work with 
the committee to achieve the goals established by the CPA. The main governmental organization 
coordinating with the peace committees is the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. Another 
body that must be coordinated with is the Chief District Officer (CDO) as it is the governing 
body within the community. These two relationships are essential to understanding the top down 
relationship and flow of information and resources being transmitted to the peace committees. 
Within this network, it is also important to understanding the relationship between the district 
and village level committees.  
 The relationship between the CDO and the peace committees is also important as that 
directly connects the committee members with the community. Specifically, the district officer is 
the leader of the entire district and requires his approval to be legal. Within the CLPC most 
members, 17 out of 23, were only somewhat satisfied with their relationship with the CDO. Eight 
of those 17 members were dissatisfied with the communication level between the CDO. Nine out 
of 23 said they were also somewhat satisfied with the communication level.  While this data is 
indicative of a decent relationship that is still probably evolving, as the committees have not 
worked together for very long within a given community, it is more interesting to hear the words 
of respondents describing the actual relationship with the CDO as there were no overwhelming 
responses of a positive or negative relationship necessarily. One member said the following:  
“There is not a very good relationship with the DAO [The DAO, or District Administration 
Officer, is another term for CDO]. Because of political stance, although for peace, little relief has 
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come and it could not be used in the proper place. No dispute is seen. Because not all work done 
by the DAO is reported to the peace committee.” 
 Participants also said that this relationship to the CDO, as well the national government, 
is challenging and thus relates to why the relationship is not satisfactory. 58.3% of members 
surveyed at the district level said the lack of ability to coordinate with the government is a very 
important challenge a sentiment mirroed by village level members (52.2%) who believe it is very 
to extremely important challenge. The lack of coordination with the CDO is another important 
challenge. 33.3% of district members surveyed said this challenge was somewhat and very 
important with one participant saying it was extremely important. At the village level, 69.5% said 
this was somewhat to extremely important challenge.  
The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction is the organization that coordination and 
communication should be the best in order for the committee to function effectively. 
Unfortunately, this relationship is rocky and is also one of the major external challenges the 
peace committees face when receiving funding and resources to complete their tasks. Like the 
CDO, the relationship with the MOPR is only somewhat satisfactory to members of both 
committees. At the district level, 75% of those surveyed said they were somewhat satisfied with 
the overall relationship between the MOPR but two members said they were not at all satisfied 
and one said they were only a little satisfied. At the village level, 47.8% said they were 
somewhat satisfied with the overall relationship but 26.1% combined said they were either not at 
all or only a little satisfied with the overall relationship. In terms of communication level, 58.3% 
of district level members said they were somewhat satisfied with 33.3% saying they were only a 
little satisfied. At the village level, 43.5% said they were somewhat satisfied with the 
communication level with the MOPR but a combine number of 43.4% were either not at all 
satisfied or a little satisfied.  
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It is telling to hear from members about the nature of this somewhat satisfactory 
relationship. One member within the CLPC is not even aware of the programs implemented by 
the ministry to support the peace committees. “There should be good relations between the 
Ministry and the Committee but there have not been any programs conducted by the Ministry. 
The relationship between these two organizations is limited only to building of the local peace 
committee.” Yet some were aware of the need to be supported by the ministry as one member 
said, “The Peace Committee must be assisted by the Ministry of Peace and reconstruction.” This 
may however be just a disconnect between the furthest points within the structure, the top 
national level and the bottom village level, which still is concerning in terms of analyzing how 
effective this committee can be if it’s relationship with the overseeing committee is non-existent 
or there’s a lack of awareness. It is unclear but based on this data the relationship lacking.  
It is also unclear at the district level. While the number of participants was less and thus it 
was more difficult to find sufficient data as to the exact nature of the relationship between the 
MOPR and the LPC but the open-ended responses were significant. Four respondents could not 
remember any conflict between the MOPR and their committee or said there was no conflict 
when asked. Others critiqued the relationship saying that the “Monitoring aspect in not effective. 
There has been no monitoring of any activities.” This is concerning given the reports read on 
how some committees have been monitored by the MOPR. Dhading may not have been monitor 
as of yet or there is limited information as to how they are being monitored. Either way, it does 
not seem to be an effective relationship. Another member said the “Ministry has just created the 
LPC. No power and not appropriate and sufficient guidelines.” Another member shared a similar 
opinion saying, “…LPC should be more autonomous and should have more financial power.” 
Justifying these opinions of the MOPR is that the relationship or lack thereof, is among several 
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external challenges of high importance among both committees. 53.3% of the district level 
committee members believe this lack of relationship with the MOPR is very to extremely 
important challenge. 73.9 % of the village level members believe this challenge to be somewhat 
to extremely important as well.  
 It is also interesting to note the number of responses related to funding and resources as 
challenges the peace committees face in relation to the MOPR because they are governing body 
allocating those funds. A lack of resources was both an internal and external challenge expressed 
by both the village and district level committee members. 53.3% of district level members said 
this was extremely important internal challenge and a very important external challenge as well. 
82.6% of village level members said this was an extremely important internal and external 
challenge. Other challenges include lack of funds for scholarship applicants. 33.3% of district 
level members believed this to be somewhat to extremely important. 65.1% of village level 
members believing it to be an important challenge. The inability to access these funds or benefits 
was another important challenge with 50% of district level members rating it as somewhat 
important and 30.4% of village level members rating it as extremely important.  
Overall Peace Process and the future of the Peace Committees 
 Part of assessing the overall effectiveness of the peace committee is looking at whether it 
contributes to the overall peace process within the country. One of the questions I asked in order 
to figure this out was whether or not a new constitution would eliminate the need for the peace 
committees. It is written in the TOR that once the constitution is signed the peace committees are 
effectively dissolved. Concerned about whether this would actually occur, given the unstable 
nature of the political climate and the inability to draft the constitution written by the first 
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Constitutional Assembly in time, I asked participants to see what they thought about the 
relationship between the new constitution and their role in the committee.  
Most didn’t think the government would hold elections in April for a new constitutional 
assembly. Of those who answered negatively within the CLPC, they attributed it to government 
weakness as well as a lack of resources. One member said “Because the politics of Nepal are 
very weak, all must stand on their own so I don't have hope.” Another agreed saying “Because of 
own political selfishness” the government would not be able to hold elections in April for a new 
CA. One member said this was because “Members of the Constitution Assembly won't 
understand the importance of time and money.” The results weren’t as optimistic in the LPC 
either. One flat out said the “election is not possible by the end of April.” Another noted the 
political stalemate thus far saying, “No work has been done ‘Til now so I don’t believe on it.” 
Unfortunately, we know by now that this election for the new assembly is pushed back, like 
many other dates within national politics, to November 2013. Yet the views of the members are 
still relevant and there’s a very apparent awareness of the political stagnation affecting all areas 
including the peace committees. 
 Members of both committees said they did not agree that the role of the peace 
committees would no longer be needed if the constitution was ratified it the future. Eleven out of 
23 surveyed in the CLPC said no. Five respondents in the LPC said no as well. One member 
said, “It won’t happen, need peace committee.” Another said “Peace is not a cetamol (which is 
short for paracetamol/Tylenol) that can be taken when there is a fever. That’s why peace is the 
flowing river. Instead of destroying, it should be strengthened continuously.”  
 Also relating to my research question was whether the peace committee’s role in bringing 
about sustainable peace in Nepal. When asked how members would rate their satisfaction with 
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their role in bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal the results were all positive. At the village 
level, 78.2% said they were somewhat to extremely satisfied with their role in bringing about 
sustaining peace in Nepal. At the district level, 50 % said they were satisfied with one member 
reporting they were extremely satisfied with their role in bringing about sustaining peace in 
Nepal.  
Limitations 
Literacy and language, cultural norms, and sample size are among the limitations of this 
research.  While surveying committee members allowed for a substantial amount of quantitative 
and qualitative data, not all participants were literate in writing Sanskrit. This concern was 
confirmed by the lack of answers to the open-ended questions as pointed out by my colleagues at 
CPRP. Nepalis are not used to taking surveys, culturally, and I was advised to limit my open-
ended questions because while they can read Sanskrit they are not used to writing in Sanskrit. 
Further, while the survey was translated in Sanskrit by a Nepali colleague, there were no 
guarantees that it was universally understood by the various ethnic groups. Some of the words 
and phrases in English used to create the survey may not have been easily translatable or 
understood by various ethnic groups or in Sanskrit. Given sufficient time and access to the peace 
committees, focus groups and interviews conducted by a researcher who, at the very least, speaks 
the language would yield better data. 
Culturally, there were limitations with implementing the survey. Participants understood 
the survey was voluntary as the informed consent was translated and attached to the front each 
survey.  My Nepali colleague and I were there to answer any questions for the CLPC 
participants. Yet there were differences in how the survey was administered for both the LPC 
and CLPC. In Nepal it is normal to take a survey home and return it the next day. Since there 
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was limited time after the CPRP training it was advised that this method was more appropriate 
and necessary. However, confidentiality could not be ensured completely as the survey was 
anonymous. Further, participants could have received help at home in completing the survey.   
Consequently, data collection was more quasi-experimental than originally intended. For 
example, since survey administration processes yielded low response rates at the district level the 
sample size needed to be combined to incorporate both district and village level committees with 
the village level containing two committees rather than one due to the fact that both committees 
are small. As a result, a comparison between the two levels could not occur as originally 
intended and only distinctions were made. Culturally, our plans are not always the best way and 
we need to respect the cultural norms of the people we are trying to understand. I had to 
understand and abide by the cultural practices of Nepalis.  As I was told when I got there respect 
local knowledge and to go with Nepali’s advice.   
Conclusions 
 There are several conclusions to be drawn from the given themes within the presented 
findings above. Odendaal hypothesized that Local Peace Committees need four basic methods in 
order to implement an effective committee that contributes to peace in a post-conflict society. 
These strategies are the themes which were discussed in the data collected; having a national 
mandate, inclusivity, using dialogue/conflict resolution processes, and receiving support from the 
top-down as well as training in various skill sets. These themes will provide conclusions for 
understanding the effectiveness of the LPCs and recommendations for areas of improvement in 
the future. 
In Understanding and Awareness of Mandate, data show that the majority of village 
committee members surveyed have not read the Terms of Reference (TOR). It is imperative that 
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members read this document to understand their role as peace committee members. Currently, 
LPC members do not receive any formal orientations from the MOPR after the initial formation 
of the committee. While this may affect their ability to fully complete their mandate most 
members surveyed are able to identify the duties and responsibilities in which their committee 
had participated. So while it is effective that the Local Peace Committees in Nepal have a 
national mandate, the mandate does little to formalize communication with the national 
leadership that would confer legitimacy and credibility to the local committees. As a result, there 
are still challenges with communication and understanding of responsibilities.  
In terms of inclusivity in post-conflict societies, representation from stakeholders on both 
sides of the conflict is necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Local peace committees 
are proven effective when members committed to peace come from political parties, civil 
society, and marginalized groups. The LPCs in Nepal are similarly comprised. These peace 
committees adhere to mandates to establish inclusivity but they are not always successful or 
well-functioning bodies. Data show that internal issues with ethnic discrimination and 
communication problems with the hill (Palai) committee members exist, as well as a negative 
satisfaction with the relationship between ethnic groups and consensus being reached. The 
Dhading CLPC participants did not feel their committee was inclusive. Challenges of inclusivity 
make it difficult for the committees to function properly and be effective in resolving disputes. 
Data show not only high political affiliations within the peace committees but also that a 
majority of members were approached by political parties to be involved in the peace 
committees. Some have criticized that committees are too politicized, especially since at the 
national level they cannot achieve consensus. This affects the LPCs’ legitimacy and 
effectiveness. This inability to reach consensus and resolve disputes, whether due to ethnic or 
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political issues, creates many more challenges for the Local Peace Committees to achieve their 
duties and responsibilities towards reducing conflict in their society.  
The use of dialogue/conflict resolution strategies is visible in the LPCs of Nepal, for 
example dialogue, mediation or confidence-building facilitation to provide inclusive, trust-
building environments towards creating sustainable peace. Research showed these strategies are 
in the Terms of Reference for the LPCs and they are required to “Facilitate constructive conflict 
transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict” and “Work on 
reconciliation, healing and trust-building.” Data show a lack of mediation trainings which 
suggests that committee members are not equipped with these skills to properly carry out their 
duties and resolve conflicts. The LPCs may not be equipped with hard approaches to resolving 
conflicts within the community like the police or CDO, but data show they do employ dialogue 
and conflict resolutions skills when needed.  This suggests that LPCs are effectively trying to 
resolve disputes nonviolently and potentially reducing the level of conflict which contributes to 
the overall peace process. While these conflict resolution processes are in place their 
effectiveness is less apparent. Whether these processes are being used effectively to create peace 
is a more difficult question to answer. There is a high level of member satisfaction with the work 
the committees are doing to bring about peace.  This demonstrates members who are dedicated 
and hopeful that sustainable peace is attainable. However, satisfaction does not equate to 
effectiveness. Therefore evaluating effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies within the LPCs 
cannot be determined with this research alone. More action research needs to be conducted 
comprehensively in order to determine the effectiveness of these strategies within the LPCs in 
Nepal.   
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In order for local peacebuilding efforts to be effective, Top-Down Support for the Peace 
Committees need to occur. The LPCs in Nepal are not exempt. The local peace committees 
should receive logistical support as well as capacity support from the national level as part of the 
national peace process. While the creation of local peace committees started with much 
confusion as to which overseeing body was in charge of monitoring their efforts, they now seem 
to be coordinating with the MOPR and NPTF to strengthen their capacity. This relationship only 
exists in a few districts and the reports show little progress in areas with limited resources, but 
overall LPCs are receiving support from the national level structure at the MOPR. Unfortunately, 
communication and coordination is still lacking among the committees. The relationship with the 
MOPR and the village level committees are non-existent and there are complaints of the 
committee’s inability to access funds/benefits. There is a significant lack of resources that make 
it difficult for committees to carry out their mandate. This is not necessarily the fault of the 
MOPR, rather it is due to the social conditions in Nepal.  With high levels of poverty, 
unemployment and dependency of foreign resources, these conditions add to the challenges the 
committees already face. These challenges impede the effectiveness of the peace committees at 
the local level and the overall peace process in Nepal. 
When looking at the Overall Peace Process and the future of the Peace Committees there 
continues to be political stagnation at the national level which affects the local peace 
committees’ role in the peace process. The CPA contains the future goals of Nepal; the 
constitution is the language by which it is understood by its people and upheld in the country for 
the future. Since the national government cannot ratify a new constitution, there is an essential 
need for the peace committees to continue to facilitate the consensus of all stakeholders within 
the conflict from the bottom up. The political instability of the country shows its inability to 
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come to consensus, especially around issues of governance, state restructuring and federalism. 
Political deadlock and monopoly renders the LPCs incapable of functioning to fulfill their 
mandates. But if their capacities are strengthened and they receive more support from the 
national level, communication gaps will be lessened and consensus may be more easily reached 
at the grassroots level.  
Measuring the effectiveness of the LPCs within these four basic strategies may not be 
enough. While these strategies help LPCs to implement effectively, there needs to be more 
formal evaluation research of the committees to know for sure. Conducting the same inquiry on 
all 74 peace committees in Nepal, or at most the areas most affected by the conflict, could be 
beneficial to understanding the exact nature of their effectiveness and could produce more 
substantial data. Yet, questions still rose from this research that merit further inquiry as to 
whether the MOPR is effectively running their programs and overseeing the committees 
themselves. Further research could be done to identity some of the gaps in communication 
between the MOPR and the peace committees. Researching the MOPR itself to see if their 
functions are being followed would be beneficial as well. This would be important to connect the 
national and local level and serve to legitimate the LPCs as a functioning body towards the peace 
processes.  
For local peace committees members to be more effective there needs to be a more 
systematic approach that connects local level and national level processes for sustainable peace 
in Nepal. To be more effective, there needs to be more formal mediation and conflict resolution 
trainings to increase capacity for committee members. In order to increase the communication 
between the different levels of society, local peacebuilding efforts need to include the TRC and 
other programs within the MOPR. The peace process should balance the national level issues of 
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constitution-making, state restructuring, and power-sharing with the local level issues that 
ground the peace processes and provide access to resources and compensation to conflict-
affected peoples. The LPCs are the essence of locally-based peacebuilding and where hope lies 
for the Nepali people. They have the potential to unite all levels of the country, but only if 
processes are strengthened and shown to be effective. The LPCs are where inclusion meets 
Samar Basi as all Nepalis go towards peace together. If peace in Nepal is not grounded within its 
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APPENDIX A: Glossary of Terms  
Conflict Management 
…refers to the long-term management of conflicts and the people involved in them to prevent 
escalation of conflict. 
 
Conflict Resolution 
…refers to the process of resolving a dispute or conflict permanently by addressing each side’s 
interests and needs. 
 
Conflict Transformation 
…refers to changing the nature of a conflict, a de-escalation or reconciliation between the people 
or groups involved. Conflict Transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of 
social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce 
violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life 




…is achieved when everyone agrees with a decision, not just a majority. In consensus based 
processes, people must work together to develop an agreement that is good enough that everyone 
in the process can agree to it.  
 
Dialogue 
…refers to a process of sharing beliefs, feelings, interests and/or needs with another group in an 
non-adversarial, open way, usually with the help of a third party facilitator. 
 
Facilitation 
…refers to a process in which a third party assists in conducting consensus-building meetings. 
The facilitator leads the process and supports the parties in setting ground rules and an agenda, 
enforces both, and supports the participants to keep on track and working towards mutual goals. 
 
Mediation 
…is a voluntary process in which a third party assists the parties in conflict to achieve a mutually 
agreeable solution. The mediator leads the process in supporting the parties in communication 
and restoring their relationships.  
 
Needs 
…refer to the basic human needs that according to psychologist Abraham Maslow drive all 
people in order to attain certain biological and psychological requirements. 
 
Negotiation 
…is a basic way of getting what you want from someone else using verbal communication. 
Roger Fisher and William Ury developed a model in 1981 that has become very popular. It 
consists of four basic principles: separate people from the problem, focus on interests not 
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positions, invent options for mutual gain, and insist on using objective or mutually acceptable 
criteria.  
 
Peacebuilding/Sustainable Peace  
…refers to the long-term project of building peace and stable communities. The process needs to 
restore and strengthen relationships and transform unjust structures and systems. This requires 
the reconciliation of differences, apology and forgiveness of past harms, and the establishment of 
a cooperative relation between groups. 
 
Reconciliation 
…refers to the normalization of relationships between groups or people. According to John Paul 
Lederach it involves four simultaneous processes: the search for truth, justice, peace, and mercy.  
 
Reconstruction 
… includes physical, political and social reconstruction; physical relates to infrastructure of 
civilian life including housing, hospitals, schools, offices, transport and communication; political 
relates to re-establishing civilian authority where it has been destroyed with one properly 
representative of the population including rule of law, restorative justice, and police force; social 






APPENDIX B: 12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal 
Communist Party (Maoists)  
The struggle between absolute monarchy and democracy running for a long time in Nepal has now been reached in a 
very grave and new turn. It has become the need of today to establish peace by resolving the 10-year old armed 
conflict through a forward - looking political outlet. Therefore, it has become an inevitable need to implement the 
concept of full democracy through a forward - looking restructuring of the state to resolve the problems related to 
class, cast, gender, region and so on of all sectors including the political, economic, social and cultural, by bringing 
the autocratic monarchy to an end and establishing full democracy. We hereby disclose that in the existence of 
aforesaid context and reference in the country, the following understanding has been reached between the Seven 
Political Parties within the parliament and the CPN (Maoists) through holding talks in different manners. 
The points reached in understanding 
1. The democracy, peace, prosperity, social advancement and an independent, sovereign Nepal is the principal wish 
of all Nepali people in the country today. We are fully agreed that the autocratic monarchy is the main hurdle for 
this. We have a clear opinion that the peace, progress and prosperity in the country is not possible until and full 
democracy is established by bringing the absolute monarchy to an end. Therefore, an understanding has been 
reached to establish full democracy by bringing the autocratic monarchy to an end through creating a storm of 
nationwide democratic movement of all the forces against autocratic monarchy by focusing their assault against the 
autocratic monarchy from their respective positions. 
2. The agitating Seven Political Parties are fully committed to the fact that the existing conflict in the country can be 
resolved and the sovereignty and the state powers can completely be established in people only by establishing full 
democracy by restoring the parliament through the force of agitation and forming an power full - party Government 
by its decision, negotiating with the Maoists, and on the basis of agreement, holding the election of constituent 
assembly. The CPN (Maoists) has the view and commitment that the aforesaid goal can be achieved by holding a 
national political conference of the agitating democratic forces, and through its decision, forming an Interim 
Government and holding the election of constituent assembly. On the issue of this procedural agenda, an 
understanding has been made to continue dialogue and seek for a common agreement between the agitating Seven 
Political Parties and the CPN (Maoists). It has been agreed that the force of people's movement is the only 
alternative to achieve this goal. 
3. The country, today, demands the establishment of a permanent peace along with a positive resolution of the armed 
conflict. We are, therefore, firmly committed to establish a permanent peace by bringing the existing armed conflict 
in the country to an end through a forward-looking political outlet of the establishment of the full democracy by 
ending the autocratic monarchy and holding an election of the constituent assembly that would come on the basis of 
aforesaid procedure. The CPN (Maoists) expresses its commitment to move foreward in the new peaceful political 
stream through this process. In this very context, an understanding has been made to keep the Maoists armed force 
and the Royal Army under the United Nations or a reliable international supervision during the process of the 
election of constituent assembly after the end of the autocratic monarchy, to accomplish the election in a free and 
fair manner and to accept the result of the election. We also expect for the involvement of a reliable international 
community even in the process of negotiation. 
4. Making public its commitment, institutional in a clear manner, towards the democratic norms and values like the 
competitive multiparty system of governance, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human tights, principle of rule of 
law etc., the CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment to move forward its activities accordingly. 
5. The CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment to create an environment to allow the people and the leaders 
and workers of the political parties, who are displaced during the course of armed conflict, to return and stay with 
dignity in their respective places, to return their homes, land and property that was seized in an unjust manner and to 
allow them to carry out the political activities without any hindrance. 
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6. Making a self-assessment and a self-criticism of the past mistakes and weaknesses, the CPN (Maoists) has 
expressed its commitment for not allowing the mistakes and weaknesses to be committed in future. 
7. Making a self-assessment towards the mistakes and weaknesses committed while staying in the Government and 
parliament in the past, the seven political parties have expressed their commitment for not repeating such mistakes 
and weaknesses now onwards. 
8. The commitment has been made to fully respect the norms and values of the human rights and to move forward 
on the basis of them, and to respect the press freedom in the context of moving the peace process ahead. 
9. As the announcement of the election of municipality is pushed forward for an ill-motive of deluding the people 
and the international community and of giving continuity to the autocratic and illegitimate rule of the King, and the 
rumour of the election of the parliament are a crafty ploy, announcing to boycott it actively in our own respective 
way, the general public are appealed to make such elections a failure. 
10. The people and their representative political parties are the real guardians of nationality. Therefore, we are 
firmly committed towards the protection of the independence, sovereignty and the geographical integrity and the 
national unity of the country. It is our common obligation to maintain friendly relations based on the principle of 
peaceful co-existence with all countries of the world and a good-neighborhood relationship with neighboring 
countries, especially with India and China. But we request all the patriotic peoples to remain cautious against the 
false attempt of the King and the monarchists to create confusion in the patriotic people by projecting the illusory 
the fake ('Mandale') nationalism to prolong the autocratic and illegitimate rule of the King and to raise question 
mark over the patriotism of the political parties, and we appeal to the international powers and the communities to 
support the democratic movement against the autocratic monarchy in Nepal in every possible way. 
11. We heartly invite the civil society, professional organizations, various wings of parties, people of all 
communities and regions, the press community, intellectuals all the Nepali people to make the Movement succeed 
by actively participating in the peaceful People's Movement launched on the basis of these understandings reached 
by keeping the democracy, peace, prosperity, forward-looking social transformation and the independence, 
sovereignty, and dignity of the country in centre. 
12. Regarding the inappropriate conducts that took place among the parties in the past, a common commitment has 
been expressed to investigate the incidents raised objection and asked for the investigation by any party and take 
action over the guilty one if found and make informed publicly. An understanding has been made to resolve the 
problems if emerged among the parties now onwards through the dialogue by discussing in the concerned level or in 
the leadership level. 
22 November 2005  
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APPENDIX C: History of Peace Negotiation Talks (prior to CPA) 
27 Oct 2000 Informal contact between then Deputy Prime Minister Ramchandra Paudel and Maoist  
Leader Rabindra Shrestha for peace process. The process was soon disrupted because of 
the controversial release of two Maoist Leaders from detention. 
25 Jul 2001  Cease-fire announced by the government led by Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba. Maoists also 
announced cease-fire on the same day, after the government's announcement. 
30 Aug 2001  First round of peace talk between the government and the Maoists held in Godawari, 
Lalitpur. 
14 Sep 2001  Second round of peace talk held in Thakurdwara, Bardia district. 
13 Nov 2001  Third round of peace talks held in Godawari, Lalitpur again. 
21 Nov 2001  Maoists unilaterally broke down the cease-fire. 
3 Dec 2002  Maoists announced formation of 'central dialogue team'. 
29 Jan 2003  Announcement of cease-fire by both the government and the Maoists. 
13 Mar 2003  22-points Code of Conduct was signed by the government and Maoists. Formation of a 
Monitoring Team led by representative of Nepal Human Rights Commission consisting 
13 Members. 
27 Apr 2003  First-round of peace talks between the government and the Maoists held in Shankar 
Hotel, Kathmandu. 
9 May 2003   Second-round of the peace talk held in the Shankar Hotel, Kathmandu. 
30 May 2003  Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigned from the post of prime Minister. 
4 June 2003  Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa was appointed Prime Minister.  
17 Aug 2003  Third-round of peace talks held in Hapure of Purandhara VDC, Dang District. 
27 Aug 2003  Maoists broken down the ceasefire unilaterally. The statement issued by Prachanda, 
Chairman of the Maoists, stated that the significance of the ceasefire, peace talks and 
code of conduct has been ended. 
12 Aug 2004  Formation of High Level Peace Committee and the Peace Secretariat by the 
Government. 
23 Sep 2004  Deuba government formally called on the Maoists to come for dialogue. 
24 Sep 2004  Maoists reactions to the government's official call for peace dialogue. Maoists' 
Chairman Prachanda, issuing a press statement, asked six questions regarding the status 
and legitimacy of Deuba government for holding peace talks. 
25 Nov 2004 The government set January 13, 2005 as the deadline for the Maoists to come to the 
negotiating table. The government also decided that it will declare parliamentary 
elections otherwise. 
27 Nov 2004 Maoists Chairman Prachanda, in a press statement, told that the declaration of timeline 
by the government is a conspiracy and threatening. He marked that peace talks could 
not proceed in the status quo. 
16 Mar 2005 High Level Peace Committee was dissolved and the Peace Secretariat remains working 
with new TOR. 
22 Nov 2005   The SPA and Maoist signed a 12-Point Understandings for Peoples movement and 
restoration of democracy in New Delhi, India. 
6 Apr 2006 SPA declared a non-violent joint people's movement and the Maoist support the 
peaceful movement. 
21 Apr 2006 Royal address returned back the executive power to the people and offered 
SPA to form the government. SPA rejected the royal offer and declared the movement 
continues. 
24 Apr 2006 19-day peaceful and non-violent movement turned successful and restoration of 
democracy by restoring the sovereignty of Nepal inherent to the people and 
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reinstatement of the HOR. 
26 Apr 2006 Three months unilateral Ceasefire declared by the Maoist. 
28 Apr 2006 Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala was appointed as Prime Minister from NC and as a leader of 
SPA. 
30 Apr 2006 HOR passed the motion of Constituent Assembly unanimously 
3 May 2006 Government reciprocated the Ceasefire Announcement and invites the Maoist in peace 
Talk. The government also withdrew the terrorist tag and red corner notice to the Maoist 
for confidence building. 
10 May 2006 Maoists announced formation of 'Negotiation Talk Team'. Peace Negotiator of the 
Maoist Side: 
Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara Convenor 
Mr. Dinanath Sharma Member 
Mr. Dev Gurung Member 
19 May 2006 The Government announced 'Negotiation Talk Team'. Consisting of: 
Mr. Krishna Prasad Sitaula Convenor 
Mr. Pradip Gyawali Member 
Mr. Ramesh Lekhak Member 
Formation of a 'Peace Negotiation Coordination and Advisory Committee' 
26 May 2006 First round of negotiation talk held at Gokarna Forest Golf Resort, Kathmandu and 
reached an agreement on 25-Points Ceasefire Code of Conduct. 
12 Jun 2006   Formation of Peace Committee comprising of the representatives of the 10 Political 
Parties representing in the HOR by the Government in lieu of the former 'Peace 
Negotiation Coordination and Advisory Committee' 
15 Jun 2006 Second round of negotiation talk at Himalaya Hotel, Kupandol, Lalitpur, and formed a 
National Monitoring Committee on Ceasefire Code of Conduct (NMCC) and a Peace 
Talk Observer Team agreeing to request UN OHCHR to facilitate the NMCC on 25-
Points Ceasefire Code of Conduct. 
16 Jun 2006 First Summit held between Prime Minister G.P.Koirala and Maoist Supremo 
Prachanda and ended up with an 8-Point Understanding. After following the First 
Summit, Third round of negotiation talk of both Negotiation Talk Team agreed to 
form a 6 Member Interim Constitution Draft Committee for drafting the interim 
constitution. 
26 Jun 2006 Fourth round of negotiation talk between the Negotiation Talk Team held at Peace 
Secretariat and agreed the Terms of Reference and Powers of the NMCC. 
15 July 2006 Fifth and Sixth round of negotiation talk of both Negotiation Talk Team held on 15-30 
July agreed to re-form a 16 Member Interim Constitution Draft Committee for drafting 
the interim constitution including Women, Dalit and Indigenous People's representation 
on the committee. Fifth round of negotiation talk team have decided the date of Summit 
II on 21 July 2006 
17 July 2006 The Peace Committee approved the draft of Working Procedures of Local Peace 
Councils and sends it to the Government for approval 
21 July 2006 Postponement of Summit II to 28 September, 2006. 
29 July 2006 Time extension of Ceasefire for Three months by the CPM (Maoist). 
31 July 2006 SPA led Government approved the Working Procedures of Local Peace Councils 
forwarded by the Peace Committee for approval by the Government 
9 Aug 2006 5-Point request Letter to UN by the leader of the Government and the CPN (Maoist) to 
provide its assistance for the peace process of Nepal. 
25 Aug 2006 Interim Constitution Draft Committee submitted its draft constitution to Negotiation 
Talk Team. 
14 Sep 2006 SPA and CPN (M) preparatory meeting held on Godawari for the preparation of 
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Thursday Summit II and discussion for the content of draft interim constitution. 
23 Sep 2006 A preparatory meeting of the top Leaders of the CPN (M), NC(D) and CPN(UML) for 
Thursday Summit II and agreed for the future of the monarchy will decided by a 
referendum during the election of CA. 
25 Sep 2006 SPA Leaders Meeting for final discussion on the political agenda that will be discussed 
with Maoist on 28th September Summit II. 
28 Sep 2006 Postponement of Summit II to 8 October, 2006. 
8 Oct 2006 First round discussion of Summit II in Prime Minister's Residence. Representatives of 
8 Party involved in the process and they discuss all issues but could not decide 
anything. 
10 Oct 2006 Second round discussion of Summit II in Prime Minister's Residence agreed on some 
issues. The meeting agreed to re-form Election Commission up to 17 October, 2006 and 
will complete the Election of Constituent Assembly up to Mid-March of 2007. Meeting 
also decides that the Interim government will decide the date of CA election. 
12 Oct 2006 
 
Third and Fourth round discussion of Summit II in Prime Minister's Residence on 
12-15 October. 8 Party involved in the process and they discuss all issues but could not 
conclude anything. 
29 Oct 2006 Time extension of Ceasefire for Three months by the CPM (Maoist). 
8 Nov 2006 SPA and Maoist historic agreement and timeline on various issues as follows: Arms 
Management, Monarchy, Interim Parliament, Interim Government, Interim Local 
bodies, CA Election, Structure of the State 
Timeline: 
Peace Accord     November 16, 2006 
Cantonment of PLA    November 21, 2006 
Cantonment of NA    November 21, 2006 
Interim Constitution    November 21, 2006 
Declaration of Interim Constitution, 
Interim Parliament, 
Dissolution of HOR and 
National Assembly    November 26, 2006 
Interim Government    November 31, 2006 
21 Nov 2006 Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of GON and Chairman Prachanda of CPN 
(Maoist) have signed Comprehensive Peace Accord in the program on BICC organized 
by Peace Secretariat. 
28 Nov 2006 Negotiation Talk Team of GON and CPN (Maoist) have signed an Agreement on 
monitoring the management of Arms and Armies. 
8 Dec 2006 Negotiation Talk Team of GON, CPN (Maoist) and UN Representative have signed an 
Agreement on monitoring the management of Arms and Armies. 
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APPENDIX D: Nepal: Key people and parties 
Parties and Institutions 
 
Constituent Assembly (CA): 
Formed following elections in 2008, the CA represented the interim legislature in Nepal tasked 
with writing the new constitution. 601 members took their seats, with the UCPN(M) the largest 
party, followed by the National Congress and the CPN-UML. Failure to pass the constitution on 
time led to four extensions to the assembly’s tenure. On 27 May 2012 the CA was dissolved, 
after the final deadline passed with no extension agreed. 
 
Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) UCPN(M), Unified CPN(M) or CPN(M): 
The rebel group that fought the government in the 10-year armed conflict. Beginning their 
uprising in February 1996 – the same year that the pro-democracy movement forced the 
monarchy to begin restoring some aspects of democratic rule – the UCPN(M) continued their 
insurgency until 2006, when it joined the Seven Party Alliance for the restoration of democracy. 
In 2007 the CPN(M) joined the interim government, thus entering the political mainstream. After 
the general elections of 2008, the CPN(M) became the largest single party in the Constituent 
Assembly, and formed a coalition government the same year. However in 2009 party leader 
Prachanda resigned as Prime Minister, following a row with the President over the dismissal of 
the chief of the army. In 2011 the party returned to power, with the appointment of party vice-
chairman Baburam Bhattarai as Prime Minister. 
 
The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML): 
The third largest party in the Constituent Assembly after the 2008 elections, the CPN-UML was 
created in 1991 through the unification of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) and the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist). The party is regarded as moderate left-wing, and 
supplied the country’s Prime Minister for almost two years between 2009 and 2011. 
 
Nepali Congress Party (NC): 
Involved in all stages of Nepal’s path to democracy – they formed the nation’s first government 
following the end of the autocratic Rana dynasty in 1951. They the nation’s first general election 
in 1959, then saw their government dissolved and many of its leading figures imprisoned when 
the king re-took control the following year. The NC refused to participate in the panchayat 
(partyless local assembly) system that followed, and pushed for full democratisation instead. 
After mass rallies in 1990 supporting the return of democracy, the panchayat system was 
abolished and the NC won the following year’s election,. In 1994 the party stepped down 
following defeat in a no confidence motion, but returned to leadthe government on several more 
occasions until the king declared direct rule in 2005. Elections in 2008 saw the NC become the 
second largest party in the newly-formed Constituent Assembly. 
 
Palace and Royal Nepal Army: 
Despite allowing democratic elections in 1959, the newly elected government was soon 
dismissed and replaced with the partyless panchayat system, effectively returning all powers to 
King. The system continued until a growing popular pro-democracy movement, and a prolonged 
civil war with Maoist insurgents forced the reinstatement of a legitimate parliament, and the 
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eventual abolition of the monarchy in 2008. Until 2007, the palace maintained full control over 
the Nepalese army. 
 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA): 
The PLA was formed during the ‘People’s War’ as the armed wing of the (UCPN-M). Following 
the end of the conflict PLA members were housed in secure cantonments, whilst negotiations 
regarding reintegration took place between the major political parties. In November 2011 the last 
part of a deal to reintegrate ex-combatants was agreed. In February 2012 around 7,000 ex-
fighters were released from their camps and returned back into society. In April soldiers moved 
into the camps as the army took over control. Around 6,000 ex-combatants were expected to be 
integrated into the army, and another 3,000 expected to choose voluntary retirement. 
 
Seven Party Alliance (SPA): 
Coalition of seven political parties which grouped together to bring about the end of autocratic 
rule in Nepal. These were: Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party, 
United Left Front, and Peoples Front. Combined the parties had received over 90% of the vote in 
the 1991 election. In 2006 the SPA joined with the UCPN(M) to spearhead the Loktantra 
Andolan (democracy movement), which resulted in popular pro-democracy uprisings across 
Nepal. The outcome was the abolition of the monarchy and the formation of a Nepali republic 
 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM): 
A splinter group of CPN(M), based in the Terai and fighting for independence for the Madhesh 
region since 2004. It is still active after breaking a truce with the government in 2007. 
 
Young Communist League (YCL): 
Youth wing of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). The YCL was formed 
during the ‘People’s War’, and it has since provoked much controversy. Although its leaders 
state that its members are unarmed, with no military training, this claim has been widely 
challenged. Furthermore, whilst members are encouraged to participate in socially responsible 
activities, such as maintaining and improving the environment, they have also been associated 
with law enforcement activities, such as traffic management and night patrols. This may be seen 
as presenting a challenge to the authority of the state. However more recently the YCL has been 
urged to compromise on the party’s revolutionary ideals for the sake of peace and constitution. 
UCPN-M leader Prachanda was quoted as stating, on 1 April 2012: “Time has come to make 




Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda): 
Charismatic leader of the UCPN (M) since 1994, including the period of the ‘People’s War’. He 
served as the first Prime Minister in the newly democratic Nepal, following the 2008 elections in 
which his UCPN-M party won a surprise victory. He had previously spent over 20 years 
underground, as a militant communist leader opposed to Nepal’s monarchy. A conflict with 






A pivotal figure in Nepali politics, Dr. Bhattarai became the 36th Prime Minister of Nepal in 
August 2011, and was still in place at the dissolution of the CA on 27 May 2012. He is a senior 
Standing Committee Member and vice chairperson of the UCPN-M, and is highly regarded for 
his academic rigour, and personal standards of integrity. In February 1996 Bhattarai presented 
the government with a list of 40 demands on behalf of the Maoists, threatening civil war if they 
were not met. Shortly after, the ‘People’s War’ began. Bhattarai then went underground, but 
slowly emerged as the public face of the Maoists during the conflict. He became one of their lead 
negotiators in the run-up to the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
 
Relations with Maoist leader Prachanda have sometimes been rocky, featuring various 
disagreements and reconciliations during the two men’s time at the head of the UCPN-M. 
 
Ram Baran Yadav: 
Became the first president of Nepal in July 2008, nearly two months after the monarchy was 
abolished. As a leading figure in the Nepali Congress, he was at the forefront of the pro-
democracy movementAn ethnic Madheshi from Nepal’s southern lowlands, Yadav is strongly 
opposed to any idea of an independent Madhesh state. The presidency is a largely ceremonial 
position, although after the collapse of the CA in 2012, the President came into conflict with the 
UCPN-M over the status of the Prime Minister. 
 
Madhav Kumar Nepal: 
MK Nepal is a long-standing member of the CPN-UML, serving as General Secretary of the 
party for 15 years. He was e Prime Minister between 2009 and 2011, taking up office after the 
resignation of UCPN-M leader Prachanda. Previously General Secretary of CPN(UML), and 
Deputy Prime Minister during the early 1990s. Resigned in June 2010. 
 
Jhala Nath Khanal: 
Chairman of the CPN-UML since 2009, and Prime Minister of Nepal from February to August 
2011. In January 2011 he was famously slapped by a member of his own party, in protest at the 
lack of political progress in the country. 
 









APPENDIX E: Survey Questionnaire (LPC) 
Please read each question carefully and circle the answer that best fits your response. 
 
Demographics:  






2. What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
3. What is your ethnicity? ____________________________________________ 
 
Affiliations: 
4. Are you affiliated with a political party in Nepal?  
 No 
 Yes  
a. Which one? ____________________________________________ 
b. In what capacity? ____________________________________________ 
5. Are you affiliated with any governmental organization in Nepal?  
 No 
 Yes 
a. Which one? ____________________________________________ 
b. In what capacity? ____________________________________________ 
6. Are you affiliated with any non-governmental organization in Nepal?  
 No 
 Yes 
a. Which one? ____________________________________________ 
b. In what capacity? ____________________________________________ 
 
Formation of LPC: 
7. Describe how you came to be part of the LPC? (Were you asked to be a part of the LPC? 










8. Do you have a specific role in the LPC?  
 No 
 Yes 
a. If yes, what is it? ____________________________________________ 
b. If no, why? Would you like one? 
____________________________________________ 
9. Have sub-committees been formed in your LPC? 
 No 
 Yes 
a. What are the sub-committees? 
____________________________________________ 
10. Who is the Secretary of your LPC? 
____________________________________________ 
11. Who is the current Coordinator of your LPC? 
____________________________________________ 
12. Does your LPC have a Local Peace Secretariat? 
 No 
 Yes 
a. Who are those members? 
____________________________________________ 
13. Have you read the Terms of Reference for the LPC? 
 No  
 Yes  
 
For questions 14-19 please use the following scale from 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 
being extremely satisfied: 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
LPC and Chief District Officer: 
14. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the Chief District 
Officer and your LPC? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
15. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between your LPC and 
the CDO? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
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16. Please elaborate on the relationship with the CDO. Have there been any conflicts with the 









LPC and Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction: 
17. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the LPC and the 
Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
18. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between your LPC and 
an MOPR officer/representative? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
19. Please elaborate on the relationship with the MOPR. Have there been any conflicts with 








Duties and responsibilities of LPC: 
20. In which of the following duties and responsibilities outlined in the Terms of Reference 
has your LPC participated: (Please check all that apply) 
 Monitor the implementation of the Ministry’s relief and reconstruction programs 
 Support the Task force constituted by the Government of Nepal for the collection 
of the data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures 
 Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of 
debilitating political or social conflict 





 Monitor the political and social developments at the local level and to try best to 
diffuse the tension by using conflict resolution processes if there is a political 
deadlock or potentiality of violence 
 Disseminate information to members and the public on issues that affect national 
or local peace processes 
21. If any checked above, please elaborate as to what specific programs were implemented or 








22. If there are other mandates your LPC accomplished not listed above please list them here: 
 
 
LPC and Village District Committee level Peace Committees:  
23. Has your LPC created a VDC level Peace Committee? 
 Yes (Move to question 24) 
 No 
a. If not, why? ____________________________________________ 
24. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 being extremely satisfied, how 
satisfied are you with the communication level between your LPC and the VDC level 
committee? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
25. On a scale from 1-5, how satisfied are you with the overall relationship between your 
LPC and the VDC level committee? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 








LPC and Advocacy: 
26. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being not at all aware and 5 being extremely aware, how aware 
would you say the community is with your role as an LPC member? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
27. On a scale of 1-5, how aware would say the community is with the ability of the LPC to 
solve local conflicts? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
28. What are some ways your LPC has advocated for the committee itself within the district? 
 
 
LPC and Challenges: 
 Internal: 
29. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being never and 5 being always, how often would you say that your 
LPC has internal conflicts? (amongst members of the LPC) 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
         Never          rarely              seldom        sometimes         always 
 
30. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your LPC can quickly reach a consensus 
on an issue? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 











31. Please circle each of the following internal challenges your LPC may face on a scale of 1-





















Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions with 
those in mind:  
32. Has there been discussion in your LPC on how to overcome these challenges in any way? 
 No 
 Yes 
a. If yes, what has come up? Please elaborate below: 
 
 
33. On a scale of 1-5, one being not at all confident and 5 being extremely confident, how 
confident are you that these challenges will be resolved?  
1  2  3  4  5 





                              Not at all     a little   somewhat    very    extremely 
a) Lack of timely management of budget release   1 2 3 4 5 
b) Transparency issues        1 2 3 4 5 
a) LPC not mandated to reconstruct infrastructure   1 2 3 4 5 
b) Lack of transportation facility     1 2 3 4 5 
c) Lack of communication with hill committee members  1 2 3 4 5 
d) Lack of attendance with hill committee members  1 2 3 4 5 
e) Lack of training of LPC members (i.e. mediation) 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Insufficient coordination with NGO’s and other org. 1 2 3 4 5  
g) Lack of publicity/awareness with public   1 2 3 4 5 
h) Lack of resources       1 2 3 4 5 
i) Lack of coordination with DAO (no records)   1 2 3 4 5 
j) Lack of funds for scholarship applicants    1 2 3 4 5 
k) Lack of education (illiteracy)     1 2 3 4 5 
l) Language barrier (Nepali vs. other dialects)   1 2 3 4 5 
m) Ethnic discrimination/minority representation   1 2 3 4 5 
n) Gender discrimination (patriarchal society)   1 2 3 4 5 






34. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being never and 5 being always, how often would you say that your 
LPC has external conflicts? (Either with local NGOs, government agencies, the CDO, 
etc.) 
1  2  3  4  5 
         Never          rarely              seldom        sometimes         always 
 
35. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your LPC can quickly reach a consensus 
on an issue? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
         Never          rarely              seldom        sometimes         always 
 
36. Please circle each of the following external challenges your LPC may face on a scale of 














Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions 
with those in mind:  
37. Has there been discussion in your LPC on how to overcome these challenges in any way? 
 No 
 Yes 











                    Not at all     a little   somewhat    very    extremely 
a) Lack of relationship with MOPR   1 2 3 4 5 
b) Lack of coordination with CDO   1 2 3 4 5 
c) Lack of ability to coordinate with gov’t 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Political party interference with budget 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Lack of transparency of budget  1 2 3 4 5 
f) Lack of cooperation with organizations  1 2 3 4 5 
g) Inability to access funds/benefits  1 2 3 4 5 
h) Corruption/bribery     1 2 3 4 5 
i) Lack of women involvement    1 2 3 4 5 
j) Inadequate publicity/awareness with public 1 2 3 4 5 





LPC and Ethnic Identity: 




39. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 being extremely satisfied, how 
satisfied are you with the relationship between the members of different ethnic groups?  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
40. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the level of consensus reached by different 
ethnic groups on various issues? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
41. Would you describe your LPC as being inclusive towards all or majority of the various 
ethnic groups?  
 Yes 
 No 
a. If not, why do you think some groups are more represented than others? 
____________________________________________ 
b. Are you part of the ethnic group that is under-represented? 
____________________________________________ 
 
LPC and Peace in Nepal:  
42. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 being extremely satisfied, how 
would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC’s ability to use their mediation skills 
gained in the previous training to resolve conflicts?  
 
1  2  3  4  5 






43. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC’s role in 
reducing conflict in the district? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
44. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC’s role in 
developing effective VDC level LPCs? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
45. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC’s role in 
bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
LPC and New Constitution: 
46. Do you think the government will call for elections of a new Constitutional Assembly in 
April? 
 No 
a. If no, why not? ____________________________________________ 
 Yes 
b. If yes, do you think that Assembly will ratify the constitution already 
drafted by the previous Assembly within the established time frame? 
 No 
 Yes 






Survey Questionnaire (CLPC): 
 
Please read each question carefully and circle the answer that best fits your response. 
 
Demographics:  






2. What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
3. What is your ethnicity? ____________________________________________ 
 
Affiliations: 
4. Are you affiliated with a political party in Nepal?  
 No 
 Yes  
a. Which one? ____________________________________________ 
b. In what capacity? ____________________________________________ 
5. Are you affiliated with any governmental organization in Nepal?  
 No 
 Yes 
a. Which one? ____________________________________________ 
b. In what capacity? ____________________________________________ 
6. Are you affiliated with any non-governmental organization in Nepal?  
 No 
 Yes 
a. Which one? ____________________________________________ 
b. In what capacity? ____________________________________________ 
 
Formation of CLPC: 
7. Describe how you came to be part of the CLPC? (Were you asked to be a part of the 









8. Do you have a specific role in the CLPC?  
 No 
 Yes  
a. If yes, what is it? ____________________________________________ 
b. If no, why? Would you like one? 
____________________________________________ 
9. Have sub-committees been formed in your CLPC? 
 No 
 Yes 
a. What are the sub-committees? 
____________________________________________ 
10. Who is the Secretary of your CLPC? 
____________________________________________ 
11. Who is the current Coordinator of your CLPC? 
____________________________________________ 
12. Does your CLPC have a Local Peace Secretariat? 
 No 
 Yes 
a. Who are those members? 
____________________________________________ 
13. Have you read the Terms of Reference for the LPC? 
 No  
 Yes  
For questions 14-19 please use the following scale from 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 
being exremely satisfied: 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
CLPC and Chief District Officer: 
14. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the Chief District 
Officer and your CLPC? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
15. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between the CDO and 
your CLPC? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 




16. Please elaborate on the relationship with the CDO. Have there been any conflicts with the 









CLPC and Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction: 
17. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the CLPC and the 
Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
18. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between your CLPC and 
an MOPR officer/representative? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
19. Please elaborate on the relationship with the MOPR. Have there been any conflicts with 








Duties and responsibilities of CLPC: 
20. To your knowledge, does your CLPC have a written Terms of Reference or Mandate that 
is known by all members of your committee? 
 No 
 Yes 








In the Terms of Reference of the District Level Peace Committees it states that the Village 
Development Committee (VDC) Secretary or the Executive Officer of the Municipality will 
function as the Secretary of such Municipality or Village Development Committee level Peace 
Committee respectively. Assume that your committee follows the same “Duties and 
responsibilities” as the District LPC for the following questions. 
 
21. In which of the following duties and responsibilities outlined in the Terms of Reference 
has your CLPC participated: (Please check all that apply) 
 Monitor the implementation of the Ministry’s relief and reconstruction programs 
 Support the Task force constituted by the Government of Nepal for the collection 
of the data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures 
 Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of 
debilitating political or social conflict 
 Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building 
 Monitor the political and social developments at the local level and to try best to 
diffuse the tension by using conflict resolution processes if there is a political 
deadlock or potentiality of violence 
 Disseminate information to members and the public on issues that affect national 
or local peace processes 
 
22. If any checked above, please elaborate as to what specific programs were implemented or 



















CLPC and District Level Committee Peace Committees (LPC):  
24. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 being extremely satisfied, how 
satisfied are you with the communication level between your CLPC and the District level 
committee? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
25.  On a scale from 1-5, how satisfied are you with the overall relationship between your 
CLPC and the District level committee? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very       extremely 
 
CLPC and Advocacy: 
26. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being not at all aware and 5 being extremely aware, how aware 
would you say the community is with your role as an LPC member? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
27. On a scale of 1-5, how aware would say the community is with the ability of the LPC to 
solve local conflicts? 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
28. What are some ways your CLPC has advocated for the committee itself within the 
district? 
 
CLPC and Challenges: 
 Internal: 
29. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being never and 5 being always, how often would you say that your 
CLPC has internal conflicts? (amongst members of the CLPC) 
 
1  2  3  4  5 




30. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your CLPC can quickly reach a 
consensus on an issue? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
         Never          rarely              seldom        sometimes         always 
 
31. Please circle each of the following internal challenges your CLPC may face on a scale of 





















Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions 
with those in mind:  




i. If yes, what has come up? Please elaborate below: 
 
  
                    Not at all     a little   somewhat    very    extremely 
a) Lack of timely management of budget release   1 2 3 4 5 
b) Transparency issues        1 2 3 4 5 
c) CLPC not mandated to reconstruct infrastructure  1 2 3 4 5 
d) Lack of transportation facility     1 2 3 4 5 
e) Lack of communication with hill committee members  1 2 3 4 5 
f) Lack of attendance with hill committee members  1 2 3 4 5 
g) Lack of training of CLPC members (i.e. mediation) 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Insufficient coordination with NGO’s and other org. 1 2 3 4 5  
i) Lack of publicity/awareness with public   1 2 3 4 5 
j) Lack of resources       1 2 3 4 5 
k) Lack of coordination with DAO (no records)   1 2 3 4 5 
l) Lack of funds for scholarship applicants    1 2 3 4 5 
m) Lack of education (illiteracy)     1 2 3 4 5 
n) Language barrier (Nepali vs. other dialects)   1 2 3 4 5 
o) Ethnic discrimination/minority representation   1 2 3 4 5 
p) Gender discrimination (patriarchal society)   1 2 3 4 5 






33. On a scale of 1-5, one being not at all confident and 5 being extremely confident, how 
confident are you that these challenges will be resolved?  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
 External: 
34. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being never and 5 being always, how often would you say that your 
CLPC has external conflicts? (Either with local NGOs, government agencies, the CDO, 
etc.) 
1  2  3  4  5 
         Never          rarely              seldom        sometimes         always 
 
35. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your CLPC can quickly reach a 
consensus on an issue? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
         Never          rarely              seldom        sometimes         always 
 
36. Please circle each of the following external challenges your CLPC may face on a scale of 















Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions with 
those in mind:  





                   Not at all     a little   somewhat    very    extremely 
a) Lack of relationship with MOPR   1 2 3 4 5 
b) Lack of coordination with CDO   1 2 3 4 5 
c) Lack of ability to coordinate with gov’t 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Political party interference with budget 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Lack of transparency of budget  1 2 3 4 5 
f) Lack of cooperation with organizations  1 2 3 4 5 
g) Inability to access funds/benefits  1 2 3 4 5 
h) Corruption/bribery     1 2 3 4 5 
i) Lack of women involvement    1 2 3 4 5 
j) Inadequate publicity/awareness with public 1 2 3 4 5 

















CLPC and Ethnic Identity: 




39. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 being extremely satisfied, how 
satisfied are you with the relationship between the members of different ethnic groups?  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
40. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the level of consensus reached by different 
ethnic groups on various issues? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
 
41. Would you describe your CLPC as being inclusive towards all or majority of the various 
ethnic groups?  
 Yes 
 No 





d. Are you part of the ethnic group that is under-represented? 
____________________________________________ 
 
CLPC and Peace in Nepal:  
42. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being not at all satisfied and 5 being extremely satisfied, how 
would you rate your satisfaction with the CLPC’s ability to use their mediation skills 
gained in any previous training to resolve conflicts?  
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
43. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the CLPC’s role in 
reducing conflict in the district? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
44. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the CLPC’s role in 
bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all          a little           somewhat           very        extremely 
 
CLPC and New Constitution: 
45. Do you think the government will call for elections of a new Constitutional Assembly in 
April? 
 No 
d. If no, why not? ____________________________________________ 
 Yes 
e. If yes, do you think that Assembly will ratify the constitution already 
drafted by the previous Assembly within the established time frame? 
 No 
 Yes 
46. If the constitution is ratified do you agree the role of CLPC will no longer be needed? 
 No 
 Yes 
 
 
